October - November 2001

Protecting
and Defending Our Critical Infrastructure
It's hard for the
average citizen to rally to the cause of protecting "the critical
infrastructure." The patriots who banded together in
Massachusetts in 1775 had a visible enemy and orders from a foreign
power to do certain things. Now the enemy is a network of terrorists, and the
countries and institutions that keep them in business.
Several
congressional committees have examined the infrastructure protection
topic since 11 September. Closed hearings on energy infrastructure
security were held on 26 September by the Senate Energy Committee,
and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee convened on 4 October to
discuss critical infrastructure protection. Additional hearings by
several congressional bodies will continue through October.
The infrastructure
requiring protection consists of:
- Information and
communications
- Electric power
generation, transmission and distribution
- Oil and gas
production and distribution
- Banking and
finance
- Transportation
- Water supply
- Emergency
government services
Threats to this
interlocking system fall into two categories: physical attacks against
the "real property" components and cyber attacks against the
information or communications components that control them.
The previous
Administration allocated the responsibilities
for infrastructure protection under Presidential Directive 63, which established a
protection center at the FBI and an interagency office in the Commerce
Department to coordinate agency responses.
The FBI's new unit
is the National Infrastructure Protection Center. This unit is both an
information-gathering center and the group that coordinates the
government's response to an "incident." Over the past three
years, it has trained 4,500 participants from federal, state, local
and foreign law enforcement and security agencies.
The Commerce
Department shares responsibility for infrastructure protection with
other federal agencies. John S. Tritak, director of the Commerce
Department's Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office,
has stated that the government should encourage appropriate
information sharing within and among the infrastructure sectors and
between the sectors and the government. He says the federal government
and the private sector must share the job of protection because, among other reasons, "the government cannot post
soldiers or police officers at the perimeters of the
telecommunications facilities or electric power plants…There are not
boundaries or borders in cyberspace. The vast majority of the nation's
infrastructure are privately owned and operated; government action
alone cannot secure them. Only an unprecedented partnership between
private industry and government will work."
Tritak said that the
tools needed "to cause significant disruption" are readily
available. "Those who can use these tools and techniques range
from the recreational hacker to the terrorist to the nation state
intent on obtaining strategic advantage."
In the private
sector, more than 70 companies and organizations have banded together
to form a "Partnership for Critical Infrastructure
Security." According to partnership president Kenneth C. Watson,
responsibility for protecting infrastructure is distributed among
companies and government organizations. This distribution is
"safer than centralization and builds resilience into the
architecture." In testifying before the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee on 4 October, Watson said the Administration faces
the challenges of streamlining its organization "to become an
effective partner to industry. The current mix of lead agencies,
sector liaisons and uncoordinated budgets makes synchronized action
difficult."
He recommended the
following actions:
- Support
Administration initiatives to streamline coordination within the
federal government
- Support
initiatives to secure the next generation of networks as well as
the "patches and fixes" that we apply today
- Encourage
government organizations, businesses and individuals to practice
sound information security
Edith T. Carper is a
special correspondent to IEEE-USA Policy Perspectives.
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