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01.12
Protecting Brand Reputation with Software Copyrights
BY EMMETT COLLAZO
When companies create software,
from industrial-strength utility programs to web
services to smart phone and tablet application
programs, they create copyrighted works. One
interest that copyright law immediately protects
is a creator company’s innovative or creative
expressions written in Python, C++, ASP, or any
other coding language. But copyright protections
can go much further: copyrights can also protect
a creator company’s reputation.
The protectable reputation
interest is best understood as the relationship
between a creator company and the public. This
reputation is unlike physical property because a
creator company will not completely control the
relationship. The relationship is partly
controlled by the creator company, and partly by
the public. Because the creator company does not
control the entire relationship, the value in
the relationship can change when competitors or
other entities interfere with the relationship.
Interference with the relationship can ruin a
business’s intellectual property portfolio. Such
damage to a business can be reflected on balance
sheets, for example in the form of a change in
the valuation properties of an intellectual
property asset.
This article discusses how and
when software copyright protections are
strongest for creator companies, and why many
creator companies have found that copyright
protection, and not patent protection, is
sufficient to preserve the creator companies’
rights. Additionally, because many creator
companies may not yet have (i) the financial
assets, or (ii) the time, to develop a patent
portfolio, this article discusses how
protections available in copyright law allow a
creator company to depend on a copyrighted
work’s value when making the creator company
more attractive for investors, or merger or
acquisition opportunities.
The strongest legal
protection for a copyright is an injunction
While there are many ways to
protect copyright interests, the nuclear legal
option is the injunction. An injunction is a
court order that either bars or restrains an
entity from some action, or forces an entity to
take a specific action. In the software context,
an injunction usually takes the form of a
restraining order, which bars an infringing
company from distributing, selling, or licensing
infringing software. Such an order barring
distribution, sales, or licensing is a nuclear
option because the court’s order will quickly
take effect throughout the United States, even
if massive shipments of a product (for example,
electronic devices containing software programs
that infringe another’s copyright) are on the
verge of being released to the public. The
injunction order is backed by draconian legal
penalties, so a court can fashion obedience to
the injunction order.
Interference with a copyright
typically arises in one of two ways. Either a
competitor has copied a software program without
any permissions (copyright infringement), or a
competitor has modified a copyrighted work,
therefore is making an unauthorized derivative
work with the software (infringement of
derivative works). In either case, a
competitor’s subsequent distribution, sale, or
licensing of that program is fodder for
injunction litigation. The copyright owner may
ask a court for a temporary restraining order or
a preliminary injunction at the earliest stages
of a lawsuit. At the injunction hearing, the
copyright owner will have the burden of proving
why an injunction is warranted.
Injunction law at the heart of
such a hearing, and specifically the legal
burden on copyright owners, has radically
changed in the last five years. The law
continues to change, albeit in a predictable
direction. Broadly, in today’s copyright
infringement lawsuits, courts will ask a
copyright owner, and the alleged software
copyright infringer, how each side, and how the
public, is being harmed by continued
infringement. The victor will be the party that
provides the best evidence of one of two
narratives: a trademark-like narrative, where an
injunction is favored, or a patent-troll
narrative, which is disfavored.
From RIM to eBay
These narratives have developed
in injunction litigation as the courts have
compared and distinguished lessons from patent
litigation (concerning uses of an inventors’
knowledge),[i]
trademark litigation (concerning branding and
reputation disputes), and copyright litigation.
Regarding lessons from patent injunction cases,
courts have learned the largest lessons from the
Research In Motion (RIM) and eBay cases.
In the former, a Virginia-based patent
holding company, NTP, Inc., sued Canadian
Blackberry maker RIM. In the early 2000’s, RIM
had created the first widely commercialized
wireless email system. NTP, which tried but
failed to commercialize wireless email, sued RIM
to prevent RIM’s inadvertent infringement of
several NTP patents. After years of litigation,
a court found RIM inadvertently infringed NTP’s
patents.
Unfortunately for RIM and the
Blackberry-using public, the general rule, in
the United States at the time was where a court
found infringement, the remedy for the
infringement was an injunction barring the
continued infringing activity. The seemingly
accepted theory was that, like an intruder
trespassing on a property owner’s land, RIM (the
intruder) should not be allowed to continue to
trespass on NTP’s patents. RIM was ordered to
cease infringing activity, which included an
immediate, nationwide end of RIM’s wireless
email service for millions of Blackberry owners.
To avoid the automatic injunction, and to allow
the millions of Blackberry owners to continue
using its service (including federal and state
government employees) RIM paid NTP $612.5
million to buy off the injunction. Then,
approximately three months after this
settlement, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
eBay.
On 15 May 2006, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s eBay decision overturned the
Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that permanent
injunctions should be ordered as an automatic
remedy for patent infringement.[ii]
Like the NTP case, the patent holder in that
case counted on the general rule to leverage a
finding of infringement to win a large
settlement. During oral argument, the Supreme
Court Justices discussed the rights of patent
“trolls,” and how intellectual property was
unlike physical property. Ultimately, the court
eliminated the general rule, and the unanimous
court reminded the courts to use the proven,
centuries-old, traditional multi-factored test
when evaluating injunction requests. The test
states that an injunction “may” (not “should” or
“shall”) be granted if an intellectual property
owner proves:
(1)
a likelihood of irreparable harm will
accrue to the intellectual property holder,
absent the injunction,
(2)
that monetary damages are inadequate to
compensate for the harm of infringement,
(3)
that “balance of the hardships” between
the parties favors the intellectual property
owner (this is where the court should consider
harm of an injunction to the infringer), and
(4)
that the “public interest” would not be
disserved by the injunction (the “public
interest” includes considering harm of an
injunction to third parties).
The unanimous opinion also
stated that the test must be used “in patent
disputes no less than in other cases governed by
such standards.” These “other cases” include
copyright and trademark cases.
Several Supreme Court Justices
then took the time to level a specific warning
to the lower courts. In the concurring opinion,
Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by three other
Justices, wrote that courts should watch for
non-practicing entities – firms using
intellectual property only to obtain licensing
fees – who might use the injunction threat as “a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees.”
These four members of the Court called for
judges to consider the threat of an injunction
being used “simply for undue leverage in
negotiations.” If a judge found a patent being
used as such a bargaining tool, the judge should
not order the injunction reflexively.
Unlike an intrusion on property, such
infringement could be compensated monetarily.
The slow adoption of eBay
into copyright law
In the last five years, the
courts have paid close attention to eBay’s
commands, as well as Justice Kennedy’s concerns.
However, when the courts have taken the eBay
warnings to heart and changed their precedents
in trademark and copyright cases,[iii]
they have been left with a problem. Before
eBay, and like patent cases, trademark and
copyright infringement cases were usually
decided with general rules. Where trademark or
copyright infringement occurred, an injunction
was usually found warranted.
Since the 2006 eBay
decision, courts have rightly removed the taint
of these presumptions from their copyright and
trademark injunction precedents. But without the
easy use of general rules, courts are left the
hard work of determining the remainder of the
balancing test, specifically (1) when money
sufficiently compensates infringement harms, and
(2) how courts should value the public interest
in continued infringement. For copyrights
specifically, courts have no consistent
standards in the copyright context for
addressing the issue raised by eBay,
namely: how do courts know when a copyright
is so minor an interest that (i) the copyright
injunction is being used for undue leveraging to
charge exorbitant fees, (ii) the copyright
injunction would not serve the public interest,
and (iii) an involuntary copyright license
should be allowed?[iv]
In part, the challenge exists because courts
cannot simply adopt patent or trademark law
injunction precedents wholesale. However, courts
have been adopting, and continue to adopt,
predictable lessons from those intellectual
property fields.
Lessons for software
companies: Psystar and Bethesda
In trademark cases, even with
eBay’s cautions, injunctions are frequently,
if not reflexively, granted, because courts have
learned that an irreparable harm exists when
infringers interfere with the relationship
between potential consumers and trademark
owners. This confusion can lead to the complete
loss of business’s reputation, or loss to a
business’s goodwill in a product’s source. These
harms are so great to consumers and trademark
owners that unlike patents and copyrights, and
despite eBay, the old “general rule” of
an automatic injunction has seen almost no
change after eBay, as the reputational
harm is “inescapable.”[v]
Like the trademark injunction
considerations of preventing consumer confusion
and protecting reputation and goodwill, and
unlike the criticized use of a patent as a mere
bargaining tool, courts have determined that
copyright infringement may also involve the loss
of the right to control reputation or goodwill.
For example, in 2009, Apple sued Psystar,
another California software company, because
Psystar made a derivative product from Apple’s
copyrighted operating system software. The
interference with Apple’s famous “walled-garden”
approach to its software products struck a chord
with the court. The court barred distribution of
Psystar’s product because “[w]ith respect to its
brand, business reputation, and goodwill,
[copyright owner] Apple has put forth
significant evidence, undisputed by Psystar,
that its investment in and commitment to high
standards … would be irreparably harmed” unless
the court ordered an injunction.[vi]
The court ordered the injunction, protecting
Apple’s copyrights in its OS software programs.
Similarly, in a 2010 software injunction case,
Splitfish AG v. Bannco Corp., the court
ordered an injunction to restore a software
company’s “intangible right to control the means
and methods by which copyrighted [software code]
is seen by the public.”[vii]
In contrast to the Psystar and
Splitfish cases, courts have not favored
attempts to use a copyright in the way the
patent owner did in the RIM case, when there is
no interference with the creator’s relationship
with the public. In the case of Bethesda
Softworks v. Interplay Entertainment, video
game developer Bethesda Software sued to enjoin
Interplay Entertainment from an internal
project, which included changes to Bethesda’s
“Fallout” video game software. But when the
court learned that nothing had been released to
the public, the court decided there was no
reason to order the injunction. Rather, the
infringement occurred in “an internal
development project.” The court found “[t]here
can be no launch of [the software] without
express permission from [the copyright owner]”
so no injunction was needed.[viii]
Thus, the use of a copyright to ransom a
settlement was not accepted. The key issue is
whether the infringer harms the software
author’s relationship with the public, and not
just that infringement occurred.
Lessons from the
entertainment industry: the public interest
factor is malleable
As in the software industry, in
the entertainment industry, to avoid an
injunction, copyright infringers must show that
the infringer’s conduct will not interfere with
a reputation or relationship between the
copyright owner and the public. For example, in
the literature context, copyright protections
have included a First Amendment right to “not
speak” in order to protect reputational
interests, and control over an author’s work.
That First Amendment right was cited in a 2010
case involving an author who used, without
permission, J.D. Salinger’s famous character
Holden Caulfield.[ix]
In that case, the court sided with the content
owner, Mr. Salinger, who, like Apple in the
Psystar case, had gone to great efforts to
protect his reputation, as well as his
characters’ reputations, such as in a number of
lawsuits.
Courts do not agree on when
copyright infringement is sufficiently in the
“public’s interest” (factor four from the
eBay test). In rare cases, copyright
infringement can create jobs. For example, in
the May 2011 injunction dispute between a tattoo
owner and movie distributor Warner Brothers, the
court found the public interest factor was
“significant” and “disruptive,” in that
thousands of jobs and numerous businesses
depended on timely release of The Hangover II.[x]
While copyright infringement will be allowed to
continue if infringement creates thousands of
jobs, cure massive business problems or human
diseases, those are rare cases.
Courts often look for a much
lower standard. In one 2011 case, a court found
the public interest factor in the eBay
test was sufficient because the public had an
interest in the continued enjoyment of watching
replays of NFL games.[xi]
Yet, while in that case the public interest was
served by allowing replays of a sporting event,
the same court, in a case involving Disney’s
copyrights, found the public interest defaults
to the copyright owner to protect the sanctity
of copyrights.[xii]
The lesson from the above is
that for infringers, the public interest
consideration is the most malleable eBay
factor, and holds the most potential for
infringers to avoid an injunction. Infringers
should try to support a narrative that (1) the
copyright owner is more like a non-practicing
entity, therefore any irreparable harm that may
exist is limited, and (2) tangible harm to third
parties (the public) exists if the injunction is
granted. Meanwhile, software copyright owners
are best protected with a focus on reputational
interests, and not on the absence of the
public’s interest in infringement.
Conclusion
In its simplest form, eBay
was meant to remove the “common judicial
response” in intellectual property cases that
where infringement existed, an injunction was
automatically warranted. To curb undue leverage
in settlement negotiations, courts in copyright
cases are slowly adopting principles that led to
the eBay decision. Their work is far
from over. Courts are continuing to create
post-eBay case law that removes
opportunistic ransoming of infringers’ business
interests, while also slowly separating truly
irreparable infringement injuries (for example,
harms to the reputation relationship), from
infringement that may actually serve the public
interest.
In that vein, infringers are
avoiding injunctions when their legal teams can
provide a narrative that focuses on the
copyright owner as a non-practicing entity that
merely seeks to obtain undue leverage in its
suit, and preventing infringement would harm the
public interest. Meanwhile, copyright owners
are best served by cloaking themselves in
copyright values that work like trademarks,
where, without an injunction, infringement
creates irreparable harm to reputation,
goodwill, and a software author’s control over
its creations, and the users’ relationship with
those creations. Legal teams will not be able to
offer black and white predictions as copyright
injunction law evolves, except for one: the
power of an injunction will likely be denied
where the software copyright owner allows itself
to be painted as a non-practicing copyright
troll seeking to extract excessive licensing
fees.
Endnotes
[i]
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 217 (2003) (distinguishing
copyright, which gives the holder no
monopoly on any knowledge, and patents,
which prevent full use by others of the
inventor’s knowledge).
[ii]
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
[iii]
Christopher Phelps & Assocs., L.L.C.
v. Galloway, 492 F3d 532, 543 (4th
Cir. 2007); Flexible Lifeline
Systems, Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc.,
654 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting
cases).
[iv]
After amassing a number of cases
identifying conflicts between
irreparable harm and public interest,
the Second Circuit admitted that, like
most Circuit Courts, it “has rarely
considered the public’s interest before
deciding whether an injunction should
issue ... [because] the public’s
interest has not in the past been a
formal factor in this court’s standard
for when to issue copyright
injunctions.” Salinger v. Colting,
607 F.3d 68, 80 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi,
J.).
[v]
Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59003, No. 09-4215
(D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (finding
irreparable harm “inescapable” because
consumer confusion existed, and aligning
public interest with limiting confusion
through an injunction).
[vi]
Apple, Inc. v. Psystar, Inc., 673
F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (C.D. Cal. 2009),
aff’d by 658 F.3d 1150, *30 (9th
Cir. 2011).
[vii]
727 F. Supp. 2d 461, 468 (E.D. Va.
2010).
[viii]
Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v.
Interplay Entm’t Corp., 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21711, No. 11-1860, *10 (4th
Cir. Oct. 26, 2011).
[ix]
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68,
81 (2d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases and
finding “not speaking” to be a First
Amendment interest that “unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury” under
Supreme Court precedent).
[x]
The tattoo was copied onto the face of
one of the actors in the movie. The
court readily found infringement, and
harm, in the form of Mr. Whitmill’s loss
of the right to control his work.
Whitmill v. Warner Bros.,
4:11-cv-00752, Trans. II-6:13-19 (E.D.
Mo. May 24, 2011). The court also
considered plaintiff’s lack of use of
the copyrighted work (he had only made
the design once, and did not tattoo
customers as part of his core artistic
business), defendant Warner Brothers’
expected losses of millions of dollars
due to an injunction, and the public’s
interest in seeing the movie.
[xi]
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens L.P.,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129530, No.
MJG-08-397, *9 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2011).
[xii]
Disney Enters., Inc. v. Delane,
446 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408 (D. Md. 2006)
(granting copyright injunction, and
stating “there is greater public benefit
in securing the integrity of
[copyrights] than in allowing”
publication of copyrighted material);
see also MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, 518
F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(applying the common reasoning that
public interest is served “when the
rights of copyright holders are
protected against acts likely
constituting infringement”).
Reprinted with permission from
Porzio, Bromberg and Newman, P.C. ©
2012 Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C.
This article does not
constitute legal advice as every situation is
different. Consult your attorney before making
any decisions.
Emmett Collazo is a
registered U.S. patent attorney at Porzio
Bromberg and Newman, P.C. He focuses on
national and international patent, trademark,
and copyright disputes.
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