> home
> About
> Contact Us
> Editorial Info
> IEEE-USA

03.11

High-Speed Rail — Have We Missed the Train?

In February, Vice President Biden and Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood traveled to Philadelphia to announce the President's plan to invest $53 billion in high-speed, intercity rail service over the next six years. The Administration calls the investment vital to U.S. competitiveness, claiming that the rail system would put the United States on a par with other countries that already have such systems in place.

While bi-partisan support exists for expanding the nation's meager high-speed rail service, there is considerable disagreement on how the projects should be funded — with federal funding or through private investment. The President's FY2012 budget, submitted last month, calls for $8 billion in funding next year. With cost-conscious members of Congress still haggling over a budget to keep the government operating in 2011, big-budget proposals like the high-speed rail initiative are sure to generate plenty of debate in the coming months.

Europe and Japan led the way to high-speed rail, with dedicated tracks connecting cities that are closer together than are major cities in the United States.  The exception is in the northeast, where there is population density sufficient to support high-speed rail, but our one train, the Acela Express, is modeled after the French TGV, but with modifications to permit operation with sharper curves in the right of way, which is shared with freight trains in the United States while dedicated rails are used in Europe.

The Acela Express is Amtrak’s only train that covers its operating costs, but the fare is twice that for slower trains.  The attraction is quicker travel from city center to city center without the hassle of airport security inspections.

In 2009 the Administration unveiled the first high-speed rail requirement under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 0f 2009 (ARRA).   The proposal was to transform the nation’s transportation system, by rebuilding existing rail infrastructure while launching new high-speed passenger rail services in 100-600 mile corridors that connect U.S. communities. This was to be similar to how interstate highways and the U.S. aviation system were developed in the twentieth century: partnerships between the public sector and private industry, including strong Federal leadership that provided a national vision.

Ten major corridors were  identified for potential high-speed rail projects:

• California Corridor (Bay Area, Sacramento, Los Angeles, San Diego)

• Pacific Northwest Corridor (Eugene, Portland, Tacoma, Seattle, Vancouver BC

• South Central Corridor  (Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Dallas/Fort Worth, Austin, San Antonio, Little Rock)

• Gulf Coast Corridor (Houston, New Orleans, , Mobile, Birmingham, Atlanta)

• Chicago Hub Network (Chicago, Milwaukee, Twin Cities, St. Louis, Kansas City, Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Louisville)

• Florida Corridor (Orlando, Tampa, Miami)

• Southeast Corridor (Washington, Richmond, Raleigh, Charlotte, Atlanta, Macon, Columbia,  Savannah, Jacksonville)

• Keystone Corridor (Philadelphia, Harrisburg, Pittsburgh)

• Empire Corridor (New York City,   Albany, Buffalo)

• Northern New England Corridor (Boston, Montreal, Portland, Springfield, New Haven, Albany)

Also, opportunities were identified for the Northeast Corridor (Washington, Baltimore, Wilmington, Philadelphia, Newark, New York City, New Haven, Providence, Boston) to compete for funds for improvements to the nation’s only existing high-speed rail service, and for establishment and upgrades to passenger rail services in other parts of the country.

Initial grants comprised $8 billion to jump-start “shovel-ready” projects with another $1 billion per year to be distributed for each of the next five years.  The funding was not intended to be all that was needed; local or state contributions would be required.  In the fine print was the requirement that federal funds would have to be repaid if the service was abandoned.

The initial links would be augmented later to flesh out the networks.

The focus was on subsidizing construction costs and not continuing operation and maintenance expense.  Some of the ridership estimates were considered over-optimistic, with the result that states could find continuing support a burden.

Routes that should prove most popular with business people would be those allowing round-trip travel in four hours, with the other half day available for transacting business.

Stimulus funds rejected for three links

Three governors, in Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin, turned back the funds to avoid incurring larger state budget deficits than they were already facing.  Ohio and Wisconsin gave up $1.3 billion while Florida gave up $2.4 billion.  While the state’s contribution was projected at $300 million in Florida, the governor believed that the state could be on the hook for $3 billion, and have to repay the $2.4 billion if it later abandoned the project.  A study by the Congressional Research Service found that only two high-speed rail services in the world were self-supporting, in France and Japan.  It also found that where the sponsors provided cost estimates, rail projects had typical overruns of 45 percent.

The link selected for funding in Florida was only 84 miles long, with five stops, originating at the Orlando airport.  A family making the trip by car would save on rail fare, and take more time for the trip, but still have transportation at both ends (there is no light rail in either Tampa or Orlando).  A Miami-Orlando link, at 230 miles, would likely have greater ridership, but was considerably more expensive to build.  Since neither Florida link has any rider history (even Amtrak connects to Tampa with bus service) passenger estimates were considered speculative.  There was talk of converting Orlando-Tampa to Orlando-Disney World (a 21 mile link) to cut out the state contribution to the construction.  However, Disney already operates a free airport bus service, the Magical Express, for guests staying on its property.

The California Corridor

The most ambitious project is the 800-mile California corridor.  It is also the most contentious.  The overall cost is pegged at $43 billion (but could be more — between $65 billion to $81 billion); $3.2 billion has already been awarded in federal funds.  In 2008 voters approved a bond issue up to $9.9 billion to build the rail system, providing that funding is matched from other sources.  At least $18 billion in federal funding is needed to complete the project.  The first section will be built in the Central Valley where land is cheaper and the terrain is flatter than along the populous coast.  But farmers don’t want their farms bisected and the route is not close to any population centers. Several affluent coastal communities have filed suit to stop rail expansion there on environmental grounds. The California High Speed Rail Authority does not plan to run any trains until at least 200 miles of rail has been laid.  With $624 million of the funds rejected by Ohio and Wisconsin diverted to California the initial segment will grow from 65 miles to 123 miles, from Madera almost to Bakersfield.  While jobs creation is often cited as a benefit for high-speed rail, a corn processing plan in Madera, employing over 100 people, plans to leave the state if forced to give up their plant by the proposed rail route.

If the system is fully built, it will cost $647 million per year for 30 years for state taxpayers to pay off the $9.9 billion in bonds.  Given the perilous condition of state finances, it is not clear that this is affordable.  The Rail Authority believes that an ongoing appropriation of over $1 billion per year would attract private investment.

No private investment is in prospect now.  Ridership estimates are in dispute.  The fare for a one-way ticket between Los Angeles and San Francisco, initially priced at $55, has jumped to $105.  A better business model is needed before the system is built.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/11/AR2011011106259.html

By 2030 it is estimated that in California only about 4 percent of inter-regional trips would use high-speed rail.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/31/AR2010103104260.html

Freight rail is an efficient way to move goods and is expanding as we climb out of the recession.  The steel interstate will be the business model attracting private investment, not high-speed passenger rail through low-population density areas.  http://www.steelinterstate.org/concept

To dig deeper

1.       Population densities for selected cities, countries

2.       Vision of HSR in America - http://www.fra.dot.gov/rpd/passenger/31.shtml

3.       Ultimate vision map - http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/Research/hsrmap-lv.pdf

4.       Map of projects - http://www.fra.dot.gov/rpd/passenger/2243.shtml

5.       ARRA investment map - http://www.fra.dot.gov/rpd/downloads/

6.       Ten major corridors identified - http://www.fra.dot.gov/Downloads/RRdev/hsrspfacts.pdf

7.       California HSR — 196 page due diligence report - http://reason.org/files/1b544eba6f1d5f9e8012a8c36676ea7e.pdf

8.      High Speed Rail in U.S. — transcript — Jan. 4, 2011 - http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2011-01-04/high-speed-rail-us/transcript

9.       Amtrak NE corridor upgraded - $117 billion in 30 years - http://www.boston.com/

10.   Congressional Research Service assessment - http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf

11.    “Money Train,” Philip Klein, The American Spectator, March 2011,  The California experience http://spectator.org/archives/2011/03/01/money-train

12.    Randal O’Toole — Are proposals for high-speed rail a boondoggle? - http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10420

13.    High-speed pork - $53 billion over six years, but final cost to extend service to 80 percent of Americans much higher - $500 billion over 25 years - http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12781

14.    Intercity passenger rail subsidy  - U.S. average $100 per 1,000 passenger miles - http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9e1c1106-fcd7-11df-ae2d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1F98aImMD

15.    Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition — book review
http://josephcoates.com/pdf_files/268_Megaprojects_and_Risk.pdf

George F. McClure is Technology Policy editor for IEEE-USA Today’s Engineer and the IEEE Vehicular Technology Society's representative to IEEE-USA's Committee on Transportation and Aerospace policy.

Comments may be submitted to todaysengineer@ieee.org.