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05.10
An Interview With 2009 IEEE-USA
Engineering & Diplomacy Fellow
Tom Tierney
By
Robin Peress
Tom Tierney is a scientist at
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) where he
supports national security programs including
counterterrorism, nuclear nonproliferation,
export controls, and laboratory astrophysics. In
2009, as the IEEE-USA Engineering & Diplomacy
Fellow, he served as a science advisor to the
U.S. Department of State’s Office of the
Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Technical
Programs. At State, where foreign policy and
cutting-edge science often intersect, Tom
facilitated R&D planning for counterterrorism
technologies, nuclear defense, emergency
response, nuclear treaties, and nuclear
trafficking prevention programs.
“It is important to have people
who are scientists and engineers by day
providing input to the policy makers,” Tom says
of his Fellowship. “It’s equally important to
have scientists and engineers that are
experienced in policy serve as ambassadors
to their peers.”
Prior to this assignment, he was
a technical staff member in Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL)’s Physics Division. He has
expertise in the areas of high energy density
physics, astrophysics, high pressure material
dynamics and response, nuclear weapons physics,
radiation transport and hydrodynamics, optical
and x-ray diagnostics, and inertial confinement
fusion concepts. Tom received his doctorate in
plasma physics in 2002 from University of
California, Irvine, and received a Master of
Science degree in physics and a Bachelor of
Science degree in astrophysics from the
University of California. He is currently a
member of the Department of Commerce’s Emerging
Technology and Research Advisory Committee which
assists in shaping U.S. export control policies.
He is a senior member of the IEEE and a member
of four other professional organizations (AAAS,
AGU, APS, and ANS). Tom has co-authored over 70
peer-review journal articles and proceedings
reports.
In this in-depth interview, Tom
discusses research and development in
counterterrorism technologies, his role as a
Department of State Fellow, and his affiliation
with the IEEE, as well as the intriguing
junctures among all three.
Q: You became
immersed in an extensive number of projects at
State. Was it difficult for you to leave after a
year?
Yes, it was. The fast pace and
dynamic environment was stimulating. The
fellowship allowed me
to fulfill a long-held desire to contribute to
the important fight against terrorism and WMD
proliferation.
Q: In your
Placement Report, you spoke of your desire to
enhance liaison between State Department bureaus
and Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) subgroups,
to help facilitate international
counterterrorism technical R&D, and to interact
with numerous bureaus, groups, agencies and
councils involved in the foreign policy-making
process. Did you fulfill these goals, and can
you provide some examples of your contributions
and learning experiences ?
Many of us live in research and
development environments that are often a few
steps removed from policy. In the policy arena,
the decision-making process and the
time-compressed requirements within which those
decisions must be made is intense. One of my
primary goals was to understand how the
government makes decisions. In Washington, this
is often done through the “inter-agency”
process. The majority of my work involved
interacting as a science advisor. My
interactions ranged from the White House to
other Departments and Agencies. With the TSWG,
I was also fortunate to be able to interact
extensively with academic institutions, national
labs, and industry. Of the three, I learned the
most from interactions with industry.
In the course of my work, I was
involved in a wide range of topics from
counterterrorism to cybersecurity to chemical
weapons to nuclear issues. I helped with
international aspects of organizing an
Explosives Detection Conference that attracted
over 600 participants from around the world. I
participated in an interagency effort to revise
U.S. government policies for cybersecurity as
well as co-organizing a short course on
international policy issues associated with
cybersecurity. I also participated in several
efforts related to Radiological Dispersal
Devices. I reviewed and advised on projects that
may help with responding to RDD events,
including post-event recovery and clean-up. I
also contributed to reviewing a classification
guide, an identification guide, and a study of
replacement materials for radiological materials
like cesium. I also worked with the Nuclear
Trafficking Response Group (NTRG) and nuclear
forensics — both of which are synergistic. The NTRG coordinates the U.S. response to
international interdictions of nuclear or
radiological materials. Nuclear forensics is
valuable for identifying where a material may
have been taken from, which is important in
supporting law enforcement investigations of
cases where a person was trafficking the
radiological material.
Q: In early
April, the Nuclear Security Summit convened; the
2010 Nuclear Posture Review was released; and
the United States and Russia signed the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Having spent a
year at the State Department at a time when
global security topped all other agenda items,
how did your unique expertise fit into this
picture?
As a person with stockpile
stewardship experience and connections, the
nuclear focus of the new administration made it
an important time to help the State Department.
In 2007, four statesmen (George Schultz, William
Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn) renewed
the 22-year-old inaugural call by President
Reagan to seek the total elimination of nuclear
weapons.[i],[ii]
President Obama carried this call into his
campaign by pledging to work toward worldwide
elimination of nuclear arsenals. As part of his
Administration’s agenda, he vowed to pursue work
on four treaties during his first term: New
START, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. With both the
change in administration and the government’s
renewed interest in nuclear treaties, it was a
very busy period for those in nuclear policy.
President Obama also recognizes
the continuing role nuclear weapons play in
global security. In his Prague speech in April
2009, he stated, “As long as these weapons
exist, the United States will maintain a safe,
secure and effective arsenal to deter any
adversary, and guarantee that defense to our
allies…”[iii]
This statement was later echoed in Vice
President Biden’s Wall Street Journal op-ed on
“The President’s Nuclear Agenda,” and the
recently unveiled 2009/2010 Nuclear Posture
Review.
Both the NPR and the New START
treaty are critical instruments for advancing
Obama’s pledge. Nuclear scientists and engineers
like myself were called upon to provide credible
technical support to the development of these
documents. Their responsibilities were to ensure
the policy commitments neither exceeded our
capabilities nor generated new national security
vulnerabilities and at the same time preserved
our capabilities to respond to emerging threats.
Q: Who are some
of your preferred authors and thinkers on the
subject of nuclear terrorism, nonproliferation
and related topics, and can you name some
reading material that you would recommend to
IEEE-USA members?
For me, the most eye-awakening
books were those that covered the story of a
Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan. This
person built up a secret network of suppliers
and smugglers to provide nuclear technologies to
countries in the Middle East and Asia. As the
world’s most alarming nuclear proliferator, he
placed millions of lives at risk by selling
nuclear technologies to unstable and
terrorism-prone regions of the world. This case,
in particular, motivated my desire to engage
policy and to make active steps to counter
future threats to our nation’s security.
The topics of nuclear
proliferation and nuclear arms control are very
mature with over four decades of development.
It’s difficult to narrow a list down to a few
names, but I would point interested readers to
Dr. Richard Garwin, Dr. Lewis Dunn (SAIC),
Thomas Schelling (UMD), and Scott Sagan
(Stanford).
There are many outstanding
authors and analysts on the topic of weapons of
mass destruction terrorism. Personally, I found
Brian Jenkins (RAND), Sidney Drell (Stanford),
and Graham Allison (Harvard) provided uniquely
valuable insight into the broad scope of the
problem.
And finally, on the topic of
terrorism, I recommend the books “Ghost Wars” by
Steve Coll, “The Age of Sacred Terror” by Daniel
Benjamin and Steven Simon, and “Terrorism and
U.S. Foreign Policy” by Paul Pillar.
Q: You chose to
work with the Technical Support Working Group,
within the Combating Terrorism Technical Support
Office, pursuing the R&D of technologies and
tools that currently include such products as a
compact, wireless 360-degree mobile display
system called Eye Ball R1, which scans the
interior of structures for potential hazards in
tactical operations; a personal-size skin
decontamination product for use after exposure
to certain nerve agents and toxins; and the
Military Uniform Uniqueness Statistical
Evaluator, a forensic tool that recognizes a
match between camouflage uniforms seen in crime
scene photos and uniforms worn by suspects.
What does it mean to make
these “commercializable”? How did your
experience with international technical
collaborations come to the fore in this work?
Commercializable means
having completed the rapid prototyping required
to be commercially produced, or “deployable” to
the field. One of the many challenges in
developing cutting-edge counterterrorism
technologies is progressing up the “Technical
Readiness Level” chain from the basic science,
through applied science, to a deployable product
that is suitable for users. Researchers and
developers often use the term “valley of death”
for the region between R&D and a commercialized
product. While there are many hurdles in
commercial product development, getting
technologies out of the laboratories and into
the market is arguably the more difficult step.
Our ability to defeat terrorism
strongly depends upon our competency in rapidly
moving discoveries into deployable products. The
Technical Support Working Group specializes in
the rapid prototyping and development that is
required to bridge over the valley of death.
While most agencies and departments support
research independently, the TSWG enables
interagency and international support for
projects. The TSWG has standing agreements with
certain international partners that jointly
perform mutually beneficial counterterrorism
R&D. The partner countries were selected because
of their innovative counterterrorism solutions
prompted by their specific needs and
experiences.
My past experience from
collaborations with researchers in Europe and
the UK proved valuable in two ways. First,
international collaborations can be difficult to
maintain and are expensive. Delineation of
responsibilities and expectations ensures from
the start that most relationships are mutually
productive and makes effective use of the unique
talents of both teams. Second, with government
sponsored projects, some information is
protected or forbidden from being shared with
the other nation’s representatives. This is a
skill that takes time to develop and can be a
little nerve-racking at first. Having had
training and experience in knowing how to avoid
discussions that might lead to sensitive topics,
I was able to more efficiently engage the
international partners.
Q: As you have
pointed out, LANL’s groundbreaking technologies
are concerned with much more than national
security. In fact, as noted on the LANL website,
“Powerful computing capabilities, developed to
simulate the performance of nuclear weapons in
the U.S. stockpile, can be applied to the
problem of simulating the cosmos.” Can you talk
about this or another example of research at
LANL that is being channeled in two very
different directions?
One of the strengths of a
national laboratory is the confluence of
large-scale facilities with multidisciplinary
expertise. Like other weapons laboratories,
including Lawrence Livermore and Sandia, Los
Alamos also engages in research not solely
focused on nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons
stockpile stewardship involves an understanding
of a wide range of topics ranging from
electronics and solid-state physics to the
properties of materials under extreme
temperatures and pressures. A large number of
tools needed to perform nuclear weapons research
is dual-use, i.e., has both military and
civilian applications. For example, the high
performance computing platform Roadrunner
is useful for running nuclear weapons codes for
system assessments and three-dimensional
astrophysics simulations. The large-scale
simulations are valuable for improving our
understanding of how Type-1a supernovae behave
as high redshift standard candles. The Los
Alamos Neutron Science Center or LANSCE is
useful for both studying important processes in
nuclear weapons and for producing unique medical
isotopes like actinium-225 for treatment of
metastatic cancer. Furthermore, the laboratory
studies the properties of energetic materials
for weapons and currently supports the
Department of Homeland Security and the
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
with research on the properties of improvised
explosive devices and homemade explosives. At
present, approximately 55 percent of the research
performed at the laboratory is for nuclear
weapons, the remainder is in support of other
national security and energy needs. As you may
know, Los Alamos helped lay the foundation for
the Human Genome Project in the 1980s and had a
major role in the Joint Genome Institute
throughout the ‘90s. Today, LANL continues this
form of research by creating and maintaining the
influenza virus database.
Q: When you
came to the State Department, you brought not
only your technical and liaison expertise but
also your way of doing things, established over
many years at LANL. How does one bridge the
divide between one’s own organizational style
and that at State?
There are many similarities
between the way policy is developed at State and
how we perform research in a laboratory
environment. Just as there are principal
investigators in a technical project, there are
project leads in policy. Similar to journal
publication processes, there is a peer review
process for all documents whereby “clearance” on
policy documents is sought from all potentially
affected government entities. Just as
collaboration is an integral part of most
technical projects, both intra-agency and
interagency collaboration is expected.
Furthermore, by training, scientists and
engineers look at the mechanics of problems and
endeavor to isolate key variables when making a
measurement. Policymakers expect their support
staff to isolate the key issues when developing
new policy. This helps prevent “fixing things
that aren’t broken.”
There also were several
differences from the technical environment:
Policy is generally developed in teams without
attribution. That is, non-papers and documents
typically do not have author lists. Effective
communication is especially important. When
briefing senior policy makers, one should avoid
technical jargon when possible, ensure they have
enough information to make decisions, and stay
brief and to the point.
Q: At what
point in an engineering or science degree
program (11th and 12th
grade, and college undergraduate) should schools
introduce discussion on the interrelationship
between public policy and science and
technology?
Most students may not realize
there are opportunities in technology policy.
Students may also not be aware of how important
good technology policy is to the vitality of the
science and engineering enterprises. I believe
the connection and co-dependence between policy
and S&T needs to be identified as early as
possible. Science and engineering discoveries
have contributed to more than half of the
current domestic product. There’s a frequent
misperception that policy and S&T are
incompatible from a career perspective. Looking
back through history, some of the most
impressive scientific and engineering
achievements were beyond the vision of senior
leaders, and it was only when S&T experts
brought the concepts to them that a vision
formed. I’d argue for introducing examples of
how science drives and enables policy and vice
versa in textbooks.
Q: In March,
you and William Behn – 2007 Congressional
Fellow, 2008 Engineering & Diplomacy Fellow, and
now a Congressional Fellow on the House Science
& Technology Committee – collaborated on a
presentation at the IEEE-USA Annual Meeting in
Nashville, in which you recommended that
prospective applicants seek out former fellows
for guidance on navigating the application
experience. What are some of the useful inside
things that you as a previous Fellow can pass on
to an IEEE member who is considering applying
for a fellowship?
First, remember that your
reputation is important and the quality of your
work reflects upon the IEEE. Be prepared to
teach AND learn. In the words of Alexander Pope,
“A little learning is a dangerous thing.” Dive
deeply into the background literature and
understand why the policy is written the way it
is, who is responsible for what, and the
policy’s limitations.
Don’t be afraid to make
mistakes, but rather make the best decisions or
recommendations that you can within the given
time constraints and available information. Be
sure to state your assumptions clearly in cases
where insufficient information was available.
Advise on what you know. If it’s not a topic
you’re familiar with, know how to search the
technical literature to find and contact a good
subject matter expert.
If you’re going to work as a
science policy advisor, be sure to do your
homework. Read the “read-aheads” before
meetings, research the public laws, and
understand the directives (e.g., National
Security Presidential Directives). Understand
your office’s responsibilities and expectations.
In the words of Thomas
Jefferson, “A difference in opinion is not a
difference in principal.” Recognize that
everyone in DC wants to do the right thing, find
the common ground and move the country forward.
Q: Would you
explain the gist of something from your
presentation that said “policy enables science,
policy drives science, science enables policy,
science drives policy”?
Sure —
Policy enables science:
Policy affects the vitality of research through
regulations and, naturally, funding
authorizations.
Regulations can advance or
hinder science. For example, export controls can
limit international competition by keeping
certain technologies or capabilities within the
U.S. and therefore, allow our researchers the
ability to make novel discoveries before foreign
competitors do. This is sometimes a good
protective measure for the economy. At the same
time export controls have the potential to slow
our abilities to work with international
partners. In the long run, the latter can pose a
greater risk to innovation since it entices
foreign development of indigenous capabilities
and increases competition.
Another example is the use of
terahertz radiation systems at airport screening
checkpoints for full-body scanning of air
travelers. These systems reflect terahertz
radiation off the water in human skin to
tomographically image what is beneath a person’s
clothes. This technology is very valuable for
detecting concealed non-metallic weapons or
explosives. The U.S. government was very
concerned about the privacy issues associated
with this technology, which resulted in slow
deployment of the scanners domestically and
internationally.
Policy drives science:
Policy can take the form of long range planning
for technology investments. The Government has
the ability to advance research in areas policy
makers deem as priorities for the general
public.
At present, the national
priority is the energy infrastructure in
response to the energy crisis. The economy is
also growing increasingly dependent on other
natural resources—perhaps the most significant
one is water, where we may have a major water
crisis in the future.
The Christmas bombing attempt
last fall is another example where policy can
drive science. While Abdulmutallab’s attempt to
smuggle PETN aboard a Northwest Airlines flight
affected the perception that privacy trumps
security with regard to air travel, the
government is seeking novel solutions to detect
concealed explosives that preserve our need for
privacy.
Science enables policy:
Technical solutions produce capabilities that
enable the development of policies. Probably the
most obvious example is the development of
biometrics, such as fingerprints or DNA, for
identification of criminals and terrorists.
Another example is many government institutions
are required to use cryptography to secure
information from theft or abuse.
Science drives policy:
Discovery can often change society in unexpected
ways, so policy solutions are required to
maintain stability. There are many examples of
this, including the invention of steam power,
the car, the plane, television,
telecommunications, the laser, and the Internet.
Perhaps the best, recent example is the
invention of the internet. Cybercrime,
cyberattacks, and cyberspies rose alongside the
development of cyberspace. The government is now
developing policy solutions to counter such
threats… many of these solutions are coming from
scientists and engineers in industry, academia,
and the national laboratories.
[i]
President Ronald Reagan, Inaugural
Address, Washington D.C., 21 January
1985.
[ii]
“A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,”
Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn,
Wall Street Journal 04 January 2007;
“Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Shultz,
Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, Wall
Street Journal 15 January 2008; and,
“Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the
Bomb,” Hurd, Rifkind, Robertson, and
Owen, Times of London, 30 June
2008.
[iii]
President
Obama, Prague, April 2009

Robin Peress is a freelance writer living in
Manhattan. For more information, visit
www.robinperess.com.
Comments may be submitted to
todaysengineer@ieee.org.
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