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04.10
Backscatter: Don’t Blame Us
BY
DONALD CHRISTIANSEN
Here is the news I’ve been
waiting for. It turns out that when technology
goes bad, it may not be the fault of engineers
after all. Or even of technology’s users.
It seems that the time-honored
notion held by many members of the general
public, namely that faulty technology or its
misuse is primarily the responsibility of its
inventors and developers and secondarily of its
users, is now being questioned. It could be
inanimate technology itself that may be the
culprit, or at least a co-conspirator.
Without mentioning the
controversial topic of singularity, certain
thinkers are strongly suggesting that machines
must already shoulder responsibility for
unfortunate outcomes in which they are involved.
Supporters of this theory
attempt to deflate several conventional
arguments against it. The traditional argument
that must be overcome is that a machine is not
human, and so cannot be held morally responsible
for its actions. A relatively weak response
intended to defuse that challenge is that
certain non-human actors (e.g., corporations and
some animals) may also be held accountable for
their actions. Yet both have an element of
consciousness that machines do not.
A second argument that must be
refuted is that a machine is created and
operated by humans, who thus are responsible for
all its actions. One counterargument put forth
is that a computer system, for example, can do
things that were not contemplated by its
designers or users. “Things will have their own
way,” as one writer put it, sympathetically
calling the machine’s victims “hapless humans.”
Lest you may be wondering
whether I am swayed by any of these
counterarguments, let me make it clear that I am
not. Every machine or complex system I’ve ever
met turned out to be dumb. If any appear to be
inherently intelligent, they are faking
it—responding for better or worse with actions
whispered in their ears by humans.
Having said this, I nevertheless
humor my own computer. And when it misbehaves, I
chastise it, sometimes severely, making sure no
young children are within earshot. I rat out my
computer, revealing to my colleagues when it is
behaving badly, running slowly, or refusing to
carry out my wishes.
Machines on Trial
Another proposition by those
wishing to bring machines before a grand jury,
indicting them for their misdeeds, is given
again in the example of a computer program. A
computer is constrained in what it can and
cannot do, and thus it limits or otherwise
mediates what users would like it to do. If used
to help make medical diagnoses, it will only
accept inputs that are predefined and in a
specific format. The machine-accusers assign
this limitation to the computer itself, not to
its programmers. Users in the medical profession
are seen, perhaps, as codefendants for accepting
the limitations imposed by the machine and its
diagnostic program. More consequential, perhaps,
is the notably overoptimistic belief that when
some technology is incriminated in some immoral
action, as in the case of napalm or cluster
bombs, it could be sentenced to “execution.”
If there is a redeeming aspect
to the philosophy of those who believe in
machine consciousness and responsibility, it may
be in their encouragement of human brain
research. It may also to some extent reinforce
failure analysis techniques. As one believer in
machine-guilt put it, “The point is not to
absolve humans of responsibility, but to
attribute responsibility where it lies,
regardless of humanness.”
Of course there are the
singularity extremists who stretch the notion of
machine consciousness, yearning for the day when
they themselves can roam the earth as a
reconstructed clone. Its artificial brain will
be loaded with their life experiences. If you
count yourself among those dreamers, let me
remind you that your clone would not be you. It
would be a total fake. The unfeeling robot would
not experience pleasure or pain, nor be
conscious of the feelings of any living creature
in its social circle.
I ask that you not mention any
of the foregoing to my computer. I do not want
to hurt its feelings any more than I have
already done through my incessant complaining
about its shortcomings and intentional errors.
References
Arnold, M., and C. Pearce, “Is
Technology Innocent? Holding Technologies to
Moral Account,” IEEE Technology and Society
Magazine, Summer 2008.
Perkowitz, S., Digital People,
Joseph Henry Press, 2004.
Birsch, D., “Moral
Responsibility for Harm Caused by Computer
System Failures,” Ethics and Information
Technology, Vol. 6, 2005.
Floridi, L, and Sanders, J.W.,
“On the Morality of Artificial Agents,” Minds
Much, Vol. 14, August 2004.
Horgan, J., “The Consciousness
Conundrum,” IEEE Spectrum, June 2008.
Nissenbaum, H., “Computing and
Accountability,” Commun. ACM, Vol. 37,
No. 1, 1994.
Swierstra, T., and J. Jelsma,
“Responsibility without Moralism in
Technoscientific Design Practice,” Science,
Technology, and Human Values, Vol. 31, No.
3, 2006.

Donald Christiansen is the
former editor and publisher of IEEE Spectrum
and an independent publishing consultant. He is
a Fellow of the IEEE. He can be reached at
donchristiansen@ieee.org.
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