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11.09
Federal Circuit Decision on Business Methods Hints at
Possibility of “Virtual Worlds” Patents
By Robert Blasi and
Andrew Baca
The Federal Circuit’s recent
decision in In re Bilski has drawn much
commentary from those who debate the
patentability of “business methods.” However,
many have overlooked a part of the Bilski
decision that may unwittingly sanction the
patentability of items and methods in virtual
worlds.
What are Virtual Worlds?
Populated with buildings,
objects and people, a virtual world is a
computer-generated environment that can be an
analog of the real world or completely
fictional. People in the real world utilizing
software running on their personal computers
make imaginary “people” navigate and act in the
virtual world. Some distinguish virtual worlds
from “massively multiplayer online games” (MMOs)
in that the former are more freeform than MMOs.
Second LifeÒ
is a popular virtual world, while World of
WarCraftÒ
and EverQuestÒ
are well-known MMOs.
Patenting Virtual Worlds
The technology behind virtual
worlds is similar to any client-server system
that manages enormous amounts of data concerning
millions of transactions from tens of thousands
of people. In this sense, the underlying
technology is much like a stock exchange
or credit card network.
All of these technology
components — network technologies, client-server
applications, computer graphics — have long been
patentable. It should come as no surprise that
there are many patents theoretically applicable
to virtual worlds that do not explicitly mention
them.
Some of the first lawsuits filed
in this space concern these types of patents.
For example, Worlds.com recently sued NCSoft,
the maker of such popular MMOs as City of HeroesÒ
and LineageÒ,
for infringing its patent on interacting in a
“virtual space.” The claims of the patent are
concerned with the display of “avatars” (visual
representations of real people participating in
the virtual world). Analogous problems are found
through computer graphics applications. For
example, in first-person shooter games like Doom
and Call of DutyÒ,
“clipping” algorithms determine which objects in
a virtual world to display to a user.
But what about patents on items
in the virtual world? Or things that avatars do
in the virtual world? How about “real world”
patents? Can a patent on a real gun apply to a
virtual world representation of that gun? Should
it? The Federal Circuit’s recent decision on the
patentability of business methods suggests an
unexpected answer to this question.
From Business Methods to
Virtual Worlds
In In re Bilski, the
question before the Federal Circuit was whether
a “method for managing the consumption risk
costs of a commodity” was patent-eligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Patent
Office rejected all of the claims as
unpatentable because “the invention is not
implemented on a specific apparatus and merely
manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a
purely mathematical problem without any
limitation to a practical application,
therefore, the invention is not directed to the
technological arts."
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
Patent Office’s rejection for a different
reason. The problem, according to the court, is
that Bilski’s claims were drawn to a method of
managing “consumption risk,” which is an
abstract idea. So a method of managing
consumption risk is also an abstract — and
therefore unpatentable — idea. The result might
be different only if Bilski’s patent claims were
“narrowly tailored” to a particular application.
The Federal Circuit decided that
Bilski’s claims were not tailored enough,
stating that according to Supreme Court
precedent, a process claim is at least patent
eligible if: (1) it is tied to a particular
machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or
thing. It is clear that the claims of the Bilski
application are not tied to a particular machine
or apparatus because no machine is recited. The
more difficult question is whether the method of
managing consumption risk transforms an article
into a different state or thing. Although the
method of managing consumption risk transforms
“data,” the Federal Circuit held that to be
patent-eligible, a method must transform an
article to a different state or thing.
“Purported transformations or manipulations
simply of public or private legal obligations or
relationships, business risks, or other such
abstractions,” said the court, “cannot meet the
test because they are not physical objects or
substances, and they are not representative of
physical objects or substances.”
This last phrase is particularly
pertinent to the question of patents in virtual
worlds. Many objects in virtual worlds are
“representative of physical objects or
substances.” According to the Bilski
court, a claim that clearly recites data
representing physical and tangible objects (e.g.,
X-rays of bones, organs, etc.) can be patentable
subject matter. This reasoning seems applicable
to virtual worlds, which are full of
representations of physical objects or
substances.
At this time, however, there are
more questions than answers. First, what are
“physical objects”? Data may “represent” an
object in a virtual world that may or may not
exist in the real world. In Bilski, the
Federal Circuit sanctioned as patentable
manipulations of data representing real human
organs. Some virtual objects, like a virtual
Eiffel Tower, definitely exist in the real
world. Some virtual objects, like virtual
organs, could exist in the real world. And some
virtual objects, like a dragon, do not. Do these
distinctions matter?
Also, what constitutes a
“transformation”? Students of computer graphics
know that any data representative of a physical
object in a virtual world must go through
several “transformations” to display a picture
of that object. Those transformations include
scaling, rotation, projection, etc. But how much
transformation is enough? Would merely
displaying a bitmap satisfy the Federal
Circuit’s appetite for a transformation?
The answers to these legal
questions will slowly coalesce as patent
applicants, seeking to protect their gaming
revenues, file patent applications that push the
Bilski logic to its limits. And the
resolution of these questions will doubtless
spur new questions -- Who is the infringer?
Where did infringement occur? How do we apply
intellectual property rights to virtual worlds
that are literally embodied across millions of
computers around the world? Only time will tell.

Robert Blasi is a partner in
Goodwin Procter’s Business Law Department and
has been an IEEE member for 15 years. As a
patent attorney, he assists high-technology
clients with open source software issues,
intellectual property protection, licensing and
intellectual property issues rising in corporate
transactions.
Andrew Baca is an attorney
in Goodwin Procter's Business Law Department, a
member of IEEE, and a corresponding member of
the IEEE-USA Intellectual Property Committee. As
a patent attorney, he advises clients about
patent portfolio development and protection.
Both authors are interested
in virtual worlds and video games, and the IP
issues that arise in both.
Comments may be submitted to
todaysengineer@ieee.org.
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