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02.09

National Academies Report Calls For Substantially Revamping U.S. Export Controls and Visa Restrictions on Foreign Scientists and Engineers

By Barton Reppert

A newly released National Academies report [www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12567], prepared by a high-powered ad hoc study committee, contends that America’s Cold War-era systems of national security export controls and visa restrictions on foreign scientists and engineers are broken and need to be substantially revamped.

“The export controls and visa regulations that were crafted to meet conditions the United States faced over five decades ago now quietly undermine our national security and our national economic well-being,” the report said. “The entire system of export controls needs to be restructured and the visa controls on credentialed foreign scientists and engineers should be further streamlined to serve the nation’s current economic and security challenges.”

The National Academies report was prepared by a 20-member Committee on Science, Security and Prosperity co-chaired by John L. Hennessy, president of Stanford University, and Brent Scowcroft, former White House national security adviser and now president of the Scowcroft Group.

“In the modern globalized world of science and technology, restrictions on the flow of information, technology and scientists can negatively impact both U.S. competitiveness and security,” Hennessy said in releasing the National Academies study.

Scowcroft contended that the United States “needs to change to a philosophy that everything is open — and restricted only when it is demonstrated that it needs to be.”

Asked for comment on the National Academies study, IEEE-USA President Gordon Day said: “This report explores issues that are of great concern to U.S. high-tech companies, particularly those that have competitors in other countries. Though there is a framework for harmonizing regulations among exporting countries, detailed interpretations sometimes differ, and advances in technology sometimes occur faster than regulations can be adapted.”

Rep. Bart Gordon, D-Tenn., chairman of the House Science and Technology Committee, commented: “The nation owes a debt of gratitude to co-chairs Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Stanford University President John Hennessy as well as the other distinguished Americans who worked on this report. There has been increasing evidence in recent years that the existing national security controls that regulate access to and export of science and technology are broken and need to be revised in a manner that preserves the vitality of our science and technology enterprise and ensures that our national security is protected.”

Gordon added: “The report represents a serious attempt to better understand the nature of the problem and to offer recommendations for reform. This report should be of interest to Congress and the incoming Obama Administration, and the Science and Technology Committee will be examining it closely over the coming months.”

The report recommends the creation of two new entities to make the export control process function more smoothly and to help resolve disputes when they occur: (1) a Coordinating Center for Export Controls that would coordinate interactions with companies or universities seeking export licenses and manage agency processes with regard to granting or denying export licenses; and (2) an Export License Appeals Panel, comprised of active or retired federal judges, that would hear disputes on licensing decisions and “sunset” requirements. According to report, both entities should be placed within the National Security Council structure, with the director of the Coordinating Center reporting to the national security adviser.

Russell J. Lefevre, past president of IEEE-USA, said he would agree with the National Academies report’s characterization of the current system of national security controls as “a technological Maginot Line.”

He observed that “in some cases, the persons assigned to evaluate an export license application aren’t necessarily fully qualified to make the determination. The net result can be a negative recommendation since it is always easier to justify a negative response in a bureaucratic environment.”

Lefevre noted that Craig Barrett, board chairman of Intel, has mentioned many times that “a large portion of Intel’s sales in a given year aren’t even in the inventory at the beginning of the year. When the state of the art is changing that quickly, the job of evaluating whether something is or should be on the (controlled exports) list becomes very difficult.”

Lefevre said he likes the report’s recommendation about establishing a new Coordinating Center for Export Controls. “The current system where as many as three agencies — State, Commerce and Defense — are in the loop causes a lot of confusion and delay. One agency with the functions recommended should make a big difference. I also like putting it under the NSC. It seems to me that that NSC is the appropriate agency to evaluate the risk to our national security.”

Martin M. Sokoloski, chairman of the IEEE-USA Research and Development Policy Committee, commented that “export controls manifested in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and its associated Munitions List have become a bureaucratic landmine for U.S. industry. Hence I agree with the NAS report that it has become a ‘technological Maginot Line.’”

“Some controls are necessary and how to do this is a problem,” Sokoloski said. “Specifically, in the U.S. space program, a February 2008 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) . . . stated that ‘given the interdependence between the defense, intelligence, civil and commercial sectors of space, U.S. leadership in all four is important. A prudent export control policy is necessary to control sensitive technologies.’ However, the bureaucratic chaos in enforcing the current ITAR and updating the associated Munitions List has not prevented the rise of foreign space business and in some cases has run counter and in conflict to national space policy, which has as one goal to encourage international cooperation with foreign nations on space activities that are of mutual benefit.”

A member of the study committee which prepared the National Academies report, Gerald L. Epstein, senior fellow at CSIS, said the committee sought to develop recommendations that could be “immediately actionable” by presidential executive order, rather than having to wait for legislation to get through Congress.

Epstein noted that the report doesn’t advocate getting rid of all controls, but instead restructuring controls so that they work effectively in those cases where national security concerns are really at stake. “But on the other hand, let’s not pay a price for things that don’t work,” he said.

Another committee member, Norman P. Neureiter, director of the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, observed that “this was a very strong committee,” which initially included Robert Gates before he was named defense secretary.

“I’m particularly interested in these issues, and IEEE should be too,” he said, particularly the negative impact of visa restrictions on foreign scientists from China, India, Russia and other key countries who sometimes are prevented from attending professional conferences in the United States. “When they don’t get to the meetings, it sends a hideous message. . . . It’s just bad, and I think it needs to be fixed,” Neureiter said.

The National Association of Manufacturers commented in a statement provided to Today’s Engineer Online that “the NAM supports and encourages the U.S. government to modernize the export control system.”

The NAM statement said the National Academies report “makes several recommendations that would have a positive effect on the export control system. The NAM believes that the control lists should be reviewed and narrowed to protect only those items that are the most sensitive and supports the sunset provision in the report.”

It added that “the new economic competitiveness exemption would also help to level the playing field for U.S. manufacturers and increase their competitiveness vis-à-vis our allies without jeopardizing national security. Such an exemption would also have a positive impact on the defense industrial base.”

Barton Reppert is a freelance science and technology writer specializing in S&T policy coverage. He previously worked for 18 years as a reporter and editor with The Associated Press in Washington, New York and Moscow.

Comments may be submitted to todaysengineer@ieee.org.