|
05.08
Electricity — Even More
Basic than We Knew: Lessons from Pakistan’s
Power Cuts
by Robert Colburn, IEEE
History Center
My brother phones from
Islamabad; there has been another bombing. He
asks me to pass the word to the rest of our
family that he and his wife are okay. No time
for details, this evening’s scheduled power cut
will begin any minute…
While historians and economists
have written at length on how fundamental to
modern society electricity has become, as well
as on the societal changes wrought by
electricity, and even on electricity’s effects
on democratic change, recent power shortages in
Pakistan are showing that electricity is even
more basic than perhaps we knew. The assumption
that — should the electricity go off — we could
still eat our food cold by candlelight, needs
revision. Recently, we are finding that, if the
electricity goes off, there won’t be any food.
Or even water.
The shortages of wheat flour in
Pakistan last January, which caused a rise in
prices and long queues were a case in point. The
government blamed the food crisis — not on a
shortage of wheat per se — but on the fact that
the mills could not operate at capacity because
of power cuts, as well as on distribution
problems caused by computers and cell phones
being unusable because of the power cuts. (This
is in contrast to the situation in neighboring
countries such as Afghanistan and Bangladesh
where wheat and rice supplies have indeed been
reduced because of damage to crops caused by
heavy monsoon rains.) The power cuts were not
the only factor in the wheat shortages — price
differences in neighboring countries led to
hoarding and smuggling — but they were certainly
a major one. Water supplies were also affected,
as pumping and purification stations shut down.
By the end of January, the electricity shortage
— which had been projected to remain between
1,000-2,000 MW in 2008 — had already broken out of
that range and was pushing 3,600 MW, resulting in
serious negative effects on the economy. The
daily loadshedding was at first unscheduled,
which increased the disruption and negative
effects. Crowds protested in the streets of
Karachi, and the discontent caused by the power
cuts (unscheduled loadshedding during winter
being unusual) was certainly among the many
factors in General Musharraf’s electoral defeat
in March 2008. Musharraf had not done himself
any favors by linking himself explicitly to the
electrical supply, commenting in an interview
that the only things he looked after directly
were the war against terrorism and future power
needs of the country.
The fact that electrical power
shortages could have such large repercussions in
a nation where only approximately forty-six
percent of the population has access to it in
the first place, provides not only a vital
historical lesson but also a cautionary warning
to societies where electricity is ubiquitous.
The primary trigger — although
not the long-term cause — of the January power
cuts was a dry December. (Pakistan relies on
hydroelectric power for approximately
twenty-five percent of its electricity
generation). Thus there are parallels with
California’s energy shortage of 2000-2001, when
draught reduced hydroelectric capacity. Pakistan’s Warsak dam, which has a capacity of
240 MW, was reduced to 10 MW. Meanwhile,
Tarbella’s output was reduced to 200 MW from its
total capacity of 3,400 MW. The close connection
between food and electricity is further
underscored by restrictions on Tarbella’s water
release; because it is also an irrigation
reservoir, there are restrictions on the amount
of water it can release for electricity
generation.
Even when the rains came, and
the electricity supply increased, that did not
guarantee that the power would stay on. The
state utility WAPDA (Water and Power Development
Authority) was forced to cut off electricity to
Karachi’s city power authority because the city
power authority had not paid its bills to WAPDA.
WAPDA, and other independent power producers in
turn were having problems providing fossil-fuel
generated energy because they were unable to pay
for oil from Pakistan State Oil.
However, at least by February
the loadshedding could begin to be scheduled,
which improved the situation for industry as
well as for the consumer. The Planning
Commission developed a set of energy
conservation measures designed to reduce
electricity consumption by thirty percent.
Many of the elements in the
history of the crisis will sound familiar in
other parts of the world. Until approximately
1993, Pakistan’s generation capacity was
sufficient to meet its needs. However,
government-instituted tariffs on retail
electricity prices kept revenues too low to make
it worthwhile for utilities to invest in their
delivery or generation infrastructure,
preventing the network from keeping up with
rising demand and unable to catch up quickly
when low rainfall triggered this particular
shortage. Transmission losses (i.e. power theft)
are thirty to thirty-eight percent, as opposed
to the ten percent which might be expected
through unavoidable line losses inherent in the
distribution system. Balochistan, where much of
the country’s energy resources are, is also
where much of the political unrest is.
Transmission towers and natural gas supply
infrastructure have been blown up. Meanwhile,
the independent power producers have announced
fast-track plans to install 2,300 MW of capacity
by 2009 and a total of 3,120 MW additional
capacity by 2010.
Like so many crises, the factors
which have led to Pakistan's energy woes are multiple and
overlapping. Moreover, some of those factors can
be found in many power generation and
transmission systems throughout the world in
countries across the economic and developmental
scale. The history of Pakistan’s current
shortages of electricity, and their economic and
political effects in shaping the country’s
course, is likewise a cautionary tale for the
rest of the world.
Robert Colburn is research coordinator at the
IEEE History Center at Rutgers University in New
Brunswick, N.J. Visit
the IEEE History Center's Web page at:
www.ieee.org/organizations/history_center.
Comments may be
submitted to
todaysengineer@ieee.org.
Opinions expressed are the
author's.
|
E-mail
this page to a friend
