|
05.08
Opinion: The
Jolly Roger of Digital Television
By Sourish Basu
Technology & Copyright Laws
—
A Cat-And-Mouse Game
Thomson Multimedia wanted to
build an entertainment system — called SmartRight™
— that would let owners share
television programs with a handful of other SmartRight™ owners anywhere in the world. The
National Football League (NFL) and Major League
Baseball (MLB) were worried that SmartRight™ would reduce
their ticket sales by letting fans stay home and
watch blacked-out games streamed from SmartRight™
users in other cities. To protect their stadium
revenue, they held the specter of the Broadcast
Flag — a piece of 2003 copyright legislation
designed to prevent piracy of television
programs — to pressure Thomson into crippling
their technology. Thomson capitulated, and now SmartRight™ will only share content within the
same house.
Such use of copyright laws to
control technological innovations — especially
those disruptive to business models of content
owners — is a trend that goes back decades. In
the 1970s, the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) vehemently opposed the marketing
of Sony’s Betamax VCR — a then-novel technology
— claiming that rampant copying of televised
movies and television shows would destroy
Hollywood. MPAA president Jack Valenti famously
told a Congressional panel in 1982 that “the VCR
is to the American film producer and the
American public as the Boston strangler is to
the woman home alone.” But the VCR survived, and,
ironically, videocassette sales through the
1980s made more money for movie studios than
theater screenings.
In boosting profit margins from
videocassette sales, the film industry adapted
their business models to harvest a lot of money
from a new technology that they were initially
afraid would ruin their business. Equally
common, however, is the movie industry's
resistance to any novel technology potentially
disruptive to existing revenue channels. They
had always regarded the distribution of
copyrighted TV programs over the internet —
another new technology — to be a major revenue
killer. At their insistence, in 2003, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
introduced the Broadcast Flag regulation to curb
such distribution.
The Broadcast Flag was a scheme
for copy-protecting digital broadcast
television, which was set to replace analog
broadcasts received by nearly all existing
television sets at the time. The scheme had
technical and legal parts. The technical part
was a simple watermarking system for digital
television signals to specify the extent of
recording and copying allowed. The legal part
was a FCC regulation requiring that digital
television sets and other devices that handle
digital television content obey those
specifications.
Once again, the content industry
sought to enforce copyright by controlling
technology. Under the Broadcast Flag
legislation, manufacturing fully functional
digital television sets, computers, DVD
recorders and TiVo-like devices that allowed
consumers to freely record, re-watch and share
television programs became illegal.
For innovators, this meant
unprecedented government control over technology
for the purpose of protecting financial
interests of content providers rather than the
public interest. The legislation forced consumer
electronics companies to “innovate according to
the rules” of the entertainment industry,
suggests Susan Crawford, a visiting professor at Yale Law School. Any innovation outside
those rules — such as Thomson's SmartRight™
— could be stifled based on legality instead of
functionality.
Such legal restrictions also
meant, however, that those companies that did
choose to play “according to the rules” could
get a head-start in a regulated market,
especially if they were instrumental in drafting
those rules, such as the five biggest consumer
electronics companies (the 5C consortium of
Sony, Matsushita/Panasonic, Intel, Toshiba and
Hitachi). Their initiative in drawing up the
Broadcast Flag specification could give them a
head-start in manufacturing Broadcast
Flag-compliant devices and turn the home
entertainment market into an oligopoly of five
companies.
The Broadcast Flag — Some
History
Digital television, introduced
in the 1990s, offered improved picture quality
and interactivity over analog television, but
carried a potential cost to content providers.
By 2002, most satellite television and premium
cable channels in the United States were already
digital. That’s when Congress charged the FCC
with overseeing a transfer of the remaining
avenues (basic cable and over-the-air
television) to digital by 2006.
Digital media, unlike analog
signals, can be copied many times without any
degradation in quality — a copied digital
television program is always identical to the
original. Further, the information stream in
digital television is similar to a movie file on
a computer, explains technologist Seth Schoen of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The copied
program, just like any other file, can be easily
transferred between two computers over the
Internet. This ease of redistribution is
particularly frightening to movie studios,
explains Crawford, because their profit margins
rely on the ability to charge licensing fees for
multiple distribution outlets — such as box
office, airline performance, rental,
pay-per-view and DVD sales — for each work they
produce. So as broadcasters and consumers
migrated toward the newer, better digital
television standard, movie studios sought ways
to prevent online redistribution of digital
television programs.
One way was to limit the
viewer's ability to record programs, such as in
present-day satellite television and premium
cable. The signal in these services is scrambled
by the broadcaster and is descrambled by a
set-top box on its way to the television set. A
television that can connect to the digital
output of the set-top box must be constructed to
implement certain restrictions, such as not
recording digital content and not feeding
external recorders through a digital output.
Such restrictions are put in place by equipment
manufacturers, Schoen explains, at the
insistence of the cable and satellite companies,
who in turn must follow the restrictions to get
content from copyright owners. When Congress
pushed for digitizing all television, content
owners demanded the same level of copy-control
for the soon-to-be-digitized “clear” channels —
basic-tier cable and over-the-air digital
television broadcasts — before putting content
on them.
Scrambling the content à la
premium cable would create an over-the-air
television standard that is not free, since
viewers would have to pay for a decoder —
similar to a set-top box. Although only 15
percent of television-viewing Americans still
use rabbit-ears, “as a political matter, it’s
impossible for our senators and representatives
to give up the idea of free over-the-air
television,” explains Crawford.
Further, explains Schoen,
over-the-air digital television signals are
currently unencrypted. Although broadcasters
could create a new encrypted standard for
digital over-the-air television, “there’s no
actual installed base of television sets that
would understand that signal.” Brand new digital
television sets bought by early adopters of
digital television would not work with such a
signal, turning people away from digital
television. That would counter the FCC’s mission
of facilitating a digital transition.
Thus, maintaining unencrypted
over-the-air television became a political
issue, says Crawford, which was convenient for
content providers — since that meant they were
required to keep over-the-air television signals
clear. “They wanted their content to be
protected, and now they could ask the equipment
manufacturers to do it for them,” she explains.
It shifted the cost, effort and onus of
designing a proper copy-control system onto the
electronics companies. The content providers, on
their part, came up with the system they wanted
electronics companies to adopt.
In 2001, Fox Broadcasting
suggested embedding a descriptor — the Broadcast
Flag — in digital television programs to specify
acceptable forms of recording and distribution.
Broadcast Flag-compliant television sets would
refuse to record or share programs that had the
Broadcast Flag set. Since the actual signal
would be clear, however, a tech-savvy viewer
could build a digital television set to simply
ignore the flag. To her, the Flag would be akin
to a “No Trespassing” sign on an unlocked gate.
The Motion Picture Association of America and
the 5C consortium recommended this proposal to
the FCC, who ruled that all devices manufactured
after July 2005 that could handle digital
television signals would have to be Broadcast
Flag-compliant.
Resolution and Impacts
A consumer using a Broadcast
Flag-compliant digital television set would
discover that the ability to record a program —
to watch later or share with a friend — was now
subject to the content owner’s whim. Content
restricted by the Broadcast Flag didn’t even
need to be copyrighted, explains Crawford. Even
obvious fair uses of video, such as showing a
news clip of a disaster in a fund-raising drive,
could now be vetoed by the broadcaster. This,
argues Crawford, “goes way beyond any national
consensus we might have on the meaning of
copyright and its exceptions.”
Further, flag-compliant devices
would only talk to other flag-compliant devices,
so DVD players bought tomorrow would refuse to
work with television sets bought yesterday.
Consumers who wanted all their devices to talk to
each other would therefore face a costly upgrade
to Broadcast Flag-compliant devices.
In a post-Broadcast Flag world,
such upgrades could generate enormous revenue
for the equipment manufacturers. This prospect
may have led them to endorse the Broadcast Flag.
More importantly, they saw economic sense in
cooperating with content providers to make
Broadcast Flag-compliant devices, since movie
studios refused to make their content readable
by devices that didn't obey their copyright
restrictions.
Extraordinarily low consumer
expectations — shaped in part by living in the
United States, where devices are often clunky
and crippled — also eased the alignment of
equipment manufacturers with movie studios,
explains Crawford. “We expect devices to be
crippled. We just accept that. No one, for
example, is outraged that you can’t burn [a copy
of] a DVD,”
she adds, or play a European DVD on a U.S. DVD
player. Customers used to hamstrung
technologies, equipment manufacturers reasoned,
would not mind Broadcast Flag-compliant devices.
In many cases, however, such
compliance went over and above the requirements
of the 2003 FCC regulation. Before the Broadcast
Flag went through, four non-5C consortium
companies, including TiVo, proposed Broadcast
Flag-compliant technologies (such as Thomson’s
SmartRight™) to allow users to securely share
digital television programs across the Internet.
For example, a user who recorded a show on her
TiVo in New York would be able to view it on a
TiVo she owned in Paris, or share it with her
son’s TiVo in Los Angeles. Although geographical
localization was never a focus of the Broadcast
Flag, three of the strongest pro-flag lobbyists,
the MPAA,
NFL and MLB, vehemently opposed this functionality.
The leagues worried that fans would use this
feature to watch blacked out games — which are
not broadcast locally because stadium seats are
not sold out — by streaming them from other
cities where the leagues had permitted the game
to be broadcast. Although this objection had
nothing to do with copyright protection,
everyone but TiVo capitulated and agreed to
implement a “localization” feature in their
design — even before it went up for FCC
approval. This confirmed FCC’s own fears that
private parties with enough clout could
significantly influence the approval of
technologies.
Perhaps the most troubling
aspect of the Broadcast Flag regulation — beyond
the MPAA’s
influence, the disregard for fair use, and
muzzled innovations — was the way the FCC
overreached its authority. “The FCC doesn’t have
the jurisdiction over devices that they have
over signals” per their mandate, says Tarleton
Gillespie, author of Wired Shut: Copyright & the
Shape of Digital Culture (2007).
Broadcast Flag opponents held
that the FCC could not regulate what devices, like
TV-tuner cards, did with digital television
signals, and in May 2005, the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed. In a
lawsuit brought against the FCC by the American
Libraries Association and others, the court
threw out the regulation barely two months
before it was set to take effect.
Although the FCC regulation was
repealed, the process of enacting it has had
long-lasting consequences, says Gillespie. The
United States Constitution codified the notion
of copyright purely as a utilitarian concept, he
explains. Free exchange of ideas, the framers
realized, was essential to sustain a public
sphere full of information and discourse in the
sciences and arts. But those ideas and creative
works were not going to be put forward if the
creators felt the effort was not economically
sustainable. So the framers of the Constitution
decided to grant a limited copyright term of 14
years to the creator, purely to strike a balance
between free exchange and economic incentive.
But the present interpretation of copyright —
largely created by the entertainment industry —
has transferred the ownership of copyrights from
the artists to the content owners. Further, that
interpretation suggests that culture is best
enriched if copyright is enforced always and
everywhere, for as long as possible, with a
minimum of exceptions. “That interpretation gets
reinforced” whenever a Broadcast Flag-like
legislation is proposed and debated, muses
Gillespie, “and my worry is that’s not a useful
interpretation of copyright.”

Sourish Basu is a physics Ph.D.
student at Cornell University. Basu was selected
to be the 2007 IEEE-USA-sponsored AAAS Science
and Engineering Mass Media Fellow. He spent the
summer as a science reporter at Scientific
American. When he’s not poring over
equations, Sourish can usually to be found biking,
hiking, cooking or roaming around with one of
his cameras.
Comments may
be submitted to todaysengineer@ieee.org.
Opinions expressed are the
author's.
|