> TE Home
> About TE
> Contact Us
> Editorial Info
> E-Mail Update
> IEEE-USA

09.07

How Safe Are Our Ports?

By George McClure

U.S. ports handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo per year, $1.3 billion worth of goods move in and out of U.S. ports every day. Interference with their function would be disruptive to the U.S. economy. However, terrorist activity could destroy port facilities or use them as a channel to move materials into the United States for other destinations.

The charter for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) includes providing port security to prevent intrusion by terrorists. Recent congressional debate has focused on container screenings, but the scope is larger than just containers. The need to limit access control for personnel working in ports was underscored by the recent incidents involving smuggling of guns from Orlando to San Juan by baggage handlers using commercial flights. Truck drivers transiting port facilities to transfer cargo could represent another threat, if they are not vetted and issued credentials.

Cost-benefit analysis is the logical tool to evaluate the application of resources. Risk management, which matches resources to threats, is needed for port security — where it isn't possible to have one hundred percent protection against all threats.

The U.S. Coast Guard, now under DHS, plays a role in maintaining maritime security. This role includes boarding questionable ships, guarding against trafficking in illegal drugs, and dealing with undocumented migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea. The maritime “transit zones” to access the United States cover 6 million square miles, including the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific.

The Coast Guard has applied a port security risk assessment tool (PSRAT) over the past several years to assess risk in the various ports across the nation. Assessments have been conducted for at least 72 of the nation’s most strategic port systems [www.uscg.mil].

The Coast Guard's strategy for maritime security can be reviewed online at [www.uscg.mil].

The top 25 U.S. ports, with facilities for container operations, handle over 11 million physical containers per year, in 10-, 20-, 40- and 44-foot sizes. The measure is 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs); more than 25 million of those were handled. Over 17 million represented imports and more than 8 million for exports. Of the total, 85 percent pass through the top ten U.S. ports, which account for 20 percent of the top container ports in the world [http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov].

On the west coast, Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/Tacoma, and Oakland are the major container ports. On the east coast, New York/Elizabeth (NJ), Charleston, Savannah and Norfolk top the list. On the gulf coast, Houston rounds out the top ten. The number of containers handled is projected to more than triple by 2020 over the 2000 total — an annual growth rate of 5.6 percent [www.cbp.gov].

East coast ports could see a significant upturn in container volume when the completion of the second set of locks in the Panama Canal in 2015 removes the size limitation on container ships that can transit the present canal (the Panamax ships) [www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/02/travel_panama.html]. This could relieve some of the burden on west coast ports and transcontinental railways delivering goods from Asia to the east coast. By 2010, U.S. container freight demand is projected to outstrip available facilities for its handling. However, the Panama Canal expansion will double its container freight capacity, raising the limit from 4,900 TEUs per container ship to 12,000 TEUs.

Under the DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI), containers are checked at 51 foreign ports —  nine in the Americas and Caribbean, 24 in Europe, 17 in Asia and the East, and one in Africa —  before being loaded on ships for transport to a U.S. port. The goal is to process 85 percent of containers bound for the United States before containers leave the foreign port [www.cbp.gov].

The four core elements of CSI are:

• Identify high-risk containers. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses automated targeting tools to identify containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance information and strategic intelligence.

• Pre-screen and evaluate containers before they are shipped. Containers are screened as early in the supply chair as possible, generally at the port of departure.

• Use technology to pre-screen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be done rapidly without slowing the movement of trade. The technology includes large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines as well as radiation detection devices.

• Use smarter, more secure containers that will allow CBP officers at U.S. ports of arrival to identify containers that have been tampered with during transit.

According to CBP, experts estimate that the cost to the U.S. economy resulting from port closures due to the discovery or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction or effect (WMD/E) would be enormous. In October 2002, Booz, Allen and Hamilton reported that a 12-day closure required to locate an undetonated terrorist weapon at one U.S. seaport would cost approximately $58 billion [www.rand.org]. In May 2002, the Brookings Institution estimated that costs associated with U.S. port closures resulting from a detonated WMD/E could amount to $1 trillion, assuming a prolonged economic slump due to an enduring change in our ability to trade [www.brookings.edu/press/books/protectingtheamericanhomelandoneyearon.htm].

In 2004, legislators requested a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of reports that ABC News had succeeded for two years in a row in importing 15 pounds of depleted uranium to the United States in containers — the last from Indonesia. While depleted uranium is harmless, it has a radiation signature similar to a nuclear weapon. The crate was labeled as furniture and transferred to Maersk Logistics, a major container ship operator. CBP maintains that radiation detection equipment used today is more sensitive and would have detected the depleted uranium [abcnews.go.com and newsmine.org].

Container Inspections

Manifest reviews are completed for all shipments at least 24 hours before containers bound for the U.S. are loaded on ships at foreign ports. About 5 percent of containers are actually inspected, based on risk profiles. Legislators have proposed 100 percent scanning of containers, either overseas or at U.S. ports [www.house.gov/etheridge/Press-SafePortAct.htm and www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/CA6464111.html].

A RAND study concludes that 100 percent inspection would be warranted only if the threat of damage from potential terrorism was quite high [www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1220.pdf]. Another view is that 100 percent screening would be expensive and impractical — not in keeping with the threat [www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed072406c.cfm] — and seen as more costly than the potential risk, one must conclude.

Expedited —  “Greenlane” — handling of containers is promised through the use of RFID technology which can verify container contents to Customs standards. It is expected that this can cut the cost of handling by $1,150 per container [www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1965/1/1/]. GPS technology can be added for tracking the entire journey of a loaded container.

The proposed Greenlane Act is described at  [pnwa.net/new/Articles/Greenlane_vs_SAFEPorts.pdf].

According to CBP, some of the programs it has implemented at U.S. ports and abroad since 9/11 include:

• Screening and Inspection: CBP screens 100 percent of all cargo before it arrives in the United States and inspects all high-risk cargo.

• CSI (Container Security Initiative): CBP works with host government Customs Services to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports before they are loaded onto vessels bound for the United States.

• 24-Hour Rule: Under this requirement, a ship’s cargo manifest information must be provided 24 hours prior to the sea container being loaded onto the vessel in the foreign port. CBP may deny the loading of high-risk cargo while the vessel is still overseas.

• C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism): C-TPAT is a public-private and international partnership that involves most of the largest U.S. importers working together with CBP to improve baseline security standards for supply chain and container security.

• Cargo Scanning Technology: CBP uses large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines, as well as radiation detection devices to screen cargo. Presently, CBP operates more than 825 radiation portal monitors at our nation’s ports of entry (including 181 radiation portal monitors at seaports); utilizes nearly 200 large-scale, non-intrusive inspection devices to examine cargo; and has issued more than 14,000 hand-held radiation detection devices for use by inspectors in the field [www.cbp.gov].

The technologies used are described at  [www.cbp.gov]. Newer container-handling cranes have on-board radiation monitoring sensors. [www.gatewayva.com].

Last year, the American Association of Port Authorities reaffirmed its full commitment to the security of America’s seaports. Its Security Committee has developed a comprehensive port security manual and conducts an annual Port Security Seminar [www.aapa-ports.org/Press/PRdetail.cfm?itemnumber=1092]. It is working with government agencies to address timely security issues such as the pending Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), which the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Coast Guard are implementing to ensure those seeking access to secure port areas can be positively identified, have authorization to enter the facility and do not pose a terrorist risk.

The GAO recently completed another report dealing with port security in the Caribbean Basin [www.gao.gov/new.items/d07804r.pdf]. Duty-free access to U.S. markets from 24 beneficiary countries resulted from the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative. In addition to freight shipments and Panama Canal ship transits, the Caribbean is the world’s most popular cruise ship destination, serving some 7 million North American passengers per year. The State Department expressed considerable concern over the possibility of an explosive-laden vehicle directed at a cruise ship port facility, or directly to a cruise ship that could put U.S. citizens in peril. Security concerns include suicide attacks, standoff attacks, armed assaults, corruption and organized gang activities, geography abetting illegal activity, difficult to safeguard break-bulk and soft-top vessel cargo, stowaways, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and the presence of Islamic radical groups and foreign terrorist organizations.

In its report on risk assessment at ports and other critical infrastructure, the GAO gave high marks to the Coast Guard and Office for Domestic Preparedness, but noted that the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, with responsible for assessing risk across all types of critical infrastructure, is still developing its methodology and has not demonstrated that it can accomplish this task [www.gao.gov/new.items/d0691.pdf]. The report states that there is “a critical longer-term need: more guidance, direction, and coordination from DHS. The challenges and difficulties associated with creating a coordinated, coherent risk management approach to the nation’s homeland security have been widely acknowledged since the events of September 11 and the creation of DHS. One of the presidential directives calls on DHS to provide such guidance, but the agency has yet to do so.”

IEEE-USA has adopted a position statement on research supporting Surface Transportation Security [www.ieeeusa.org/policy/positions/surfacetransportation.html].

To Dig Deeper

• A good overview of the issue of risk management in port security is contained in:
  “U.S. Port Security Policy after 9/11: Overview and Evaluation,” by J. D. Haveman, H. J. Shatz, and E. A. Vilchis, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 2, Issue 4, 2005 [www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol2/iss4/1/].

• An overview of the entire U.S. freight distribution system is found at  [www.ftc.state.fl.us].

• Threat assessment and risk management are discussed in the article about DHS at  [www.govexec.com/features/0807-01/0807-01s3.htm].

• Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T — statement of J. Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Office of Congressional Relations, GAO  [www.securitymanagement.com/library/Gao03467t_Homeland0503.pdf].

• Good perspective at “Port Security and Foreign-Owned Maritime Infrastructure,” J. J. Carafano, Heritage Foundation, 2006.  [www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/tst030606a.cfm].

• “Container Cargo Security,” August 2003 - Application of technology to sensing and scanning problem [www.ohsonline.com/articles/44589/].

George F. McClure is Technology Policy editor for IEEE-USA Today’s Engineer and a member of IEEE-USA's Committee on Transportation and Aerospace policy. Comments may be submitted to todaysengineer@ieee.org. Opinions expressed are the author's.