Powering the 21st Century:
We can — and must — modernize the grid

by Massoud Amin

The massive power outage of August 2003 underscored the vulnerability of our nation’s power grid, and the fact that this vital yet complex infrastructure underpins our society and quality of life. The cover story in the August 2004 issue of IEEE Spectrum “The Unruly Power Grid” as well as a subsequent 10 August Washington Post Op-Ed, “Blackouts Are Inevitable — Coping, Not Prevention, Should Be the Primary Goal,” missed the mark on real issues at all levels — technological, political and economic, as well as urgent tactical and strategic dimensions — of the energy and infrastructure security challenges facing our nation.

Those authors believe that most human decision-making is based on emotions and perceptions rather than true understanding of the fundamental mathematical underpinnings, which allows for structured open decisions that consider risk and cost-benefit inputs. Coping is useful for both limiting panics and for having some low-level backups; however, to focus mainly on coping is unwisely defeatist.

As an energy professional and an electrical engineer, I cannot imagine how anyone could believe that in the United States we should learn to "cope" with blackouts — and that we don’t have the technical know-how, the political will or the money to bring our power grid up to 21st century standards. I do not believe the American people would — or should — settle for a substandard electricity infrastructure.

Transforming the Power Grid

We absolutely can meet the needs of a pervasively digital society that relies on microprocessor-based devices in vehicles, homes, offices and industrial facilities. We can reduce grid congestion and atypical power flows and meet customer reliability expectations. And it is not just a matter of “can.” We “must,” if the United States is to continue to be an economic power. However, it will not be easy, nor cheap. It will require an extensive, prolonged commitment by the federal government and the industry to provide research funding and to reduce red tape. It will take a renewed commitment on the part of industry to modernize and invest in new technology. And it will take continuing collaboration among economists, scientists and engineers to slowly but surely transform the power grid into what we know it can be — and what it must become.

The U.S. power grid that has evolved now underlies every aspect of our economy and society. The National Academy of Engineering hailed the power grid as the 20th Century’s engineering innovation most beneficial to our civilization. This network represents an enormous investment, including more than 15,000 generators in 10,000 power plants, and hundreds of thousands of miles of transmission lines and distribution networks, whose estimated worth is over $800 billion. In 2000, transmission and distribution alone were valued at $358 billion. The electric power grid was historically operated by separate utilities; each independent in its own control area and regulated by local bodies, to deliver bulk power from generation to load areas reliably and economically. Competition and deregulation have now created multiple energy entities that must share the same regulated energy delivery network.

Several cascading failures during the past 40 years highlighted our need to understand the complex phenomena associated with power network systems and to the development of emergency controls and restoration, and that number continues to rise in North America. Beginning in 1995, the amortization/depreciation rate has exceeded utility construction expenditures. Since that “cross over” point in 1995, utility construction expenditures have lagged behind asset depreciation. This disparity has resulted in a system mode of operation analogous to “harvesting more rapidly than planting replacement seeds.” As a result of these “diminished shock absorbers,” the electric grid is becoming increasingly stressed, and whether the carrying capacity or safety margin will exist to support anticipated demand is in question.

Outages Bigger, More Frequent

Analyses of data collected for the U.S. Department of Energy, which requires electric utilities to report system emergencies that can affect the reliability of bulk power delivery systems, revealed that in the period from 1991 to 2000, 76 outages of 100 megawatts (MW) or more occurred in the second half of the decade, compared to 66 such occurrences in the first half. Furthermore, 41 percent more outages affected 50,000 or more consumers in the second half of the 1990s than in the first half (58 outages in 1996-2000 versus 41 outages in 1991-1995). In addition, between 1996 and 2000, outages affected 15 percent more consumers than between 1991 and 1995 (in the second half of the decade, the average size per event was 409,854 customers affected versus 355,204 in the first half of the decade).

Similar results were determined for a multitude of additional statistics, such as the kilowatt magnitude of the outage, average load lost, etc. The conclusion was that the complex systems required to mitigate problems during periods of great demand and restoration are at great risk of serious disruption, creating a critical need for technological improvements.

Responding to Threats

As electricity’s share of the nation’s total energy continues to grow, a key to modernizing the power grid must be the improvement of the ability of the system to respond to threats, be they natural or deliberate. Today’s grid relies far too heavily on narrowly programmed protection devices that have contributed to worsening the severity and impact of power outages. These devices, which came into play during the August 2003 blackout, typically perform with simple “on/off” logic, which acts locally while destabilizing a larger regional interconnection. With its millions of relays, controls and other components, the parameter settings and structures of the protection devices and controllers in the electricity infrastructure can be a crucial issue. It is analogous to the poem "for want of a nail… the kingdom was lost." That is, relying on an "inexpensive 25 cent chip" and narrow control logic to operate and protect a multi-billion dollar machine is folly when so much is at stake. While seemingly expensive, redundancies and the ability to detour needed power around problems are absolutely essential to the modern grid.

From a national perspective, a key challenge is how to redesign, retrofit and upgrade the nearly 230,000 miles of electro-mechanically controlled transmission capacity into a smart, self-healing grid that is driven by a well-designed market approach. The electric power industry offers an immediate opportunity for launching such collaboration among engineers, scientists and economists, as new ways are being sought to improve the efficiency of electricity markets while maintaining the reliability of the network.

Considerable Challenges Remain

Creating a “better” grid with self-healing capabilities is no longer a distant dream, but considerable technical challenges as well as several economic and policy issues remain. Industry and government responsibilities, the role of the market in a modern, strategically secure power system, and funding issues (e.g., economic incentives for infrastructure investment and research) will all need to be sorted out if we are to be successful. To address these and other questions, the electric power industry and all pertinent public and private sectors must work together with other critical infrastructure stakeholders.

From a broader viewpoint, judicious investments in pertinent technologies and development of human capital can help enhance the quality of human life and serve our society. A balanced, cost-effective approach to investments and use of technology can make a significant difference in mitigating the risk. The grid has many vulnerabilities — it is imperfect — and under the “business as usual” policies of recent years with diminished shock absorbers, we must be prepared for more outages and increased cost of outages at the consumer level. However, we can and must reverse this trend.

Electricity shall prevail at the quality, efficiency and reliability that customers demand and are willing to pay for. On one hand, the question is who provides it. On the other hand, it is important to note that achieving grid performance, security and reliability are a national profitable investment, not a cost burden on the taxpayer. The economic pay-back is three to seven times, and in some cases, an order of magnitude greater than the money invested. Further, the payback starts with the completion of each sequence of grid improvement. The issue is not merely who invests money, because that is ultimately the public, whether through taxes or kWh rates. Considering the impact of regulatory agencies, they should be able to induce the electricity producers to plan and fund the process. That may be the most efficient way to get it in operation; however, the current absence of a coordinated national decision-making body is a major obstacle. States' rights, and State PUC regulations have removed the individual state's utility motivation for a national plan. Investor utilities face either collaboration on a national level, or a forced nationalization of the industry.

In conclusion, it is important to note that some of the failures identified by the Joint U.S.-Canada Task Force that investigated the 14 August 2003 blackout were not technological at all. Rather, many were human operator training issues and failures to perform simple but time-consuming and expensive tasks, such as tree trimming along transmission right-of ways. Such failures are readily remedied through greater awareness, improved training and adequate monetary resources.

IEEE-USA's Perspective IEEE-USA believes policymakers considering decisions on electric industry restructuring must consider certain fundamental principles to protect the public interest, and to maximize societal benefit. These principles should apply regardless of the regulatory regime that is ultimately adopted. In a policy position approved in June 2004, IEEE-USA offered a set of principles as guidance for policymakers. more

Massoud Amin is a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, directs the Center for the Development of Technological Leadership, and holds the HW Sweatt Chair in Technological Leadership at the University of Minnesota. Before joining the University of Minnesota in March 2003, he was with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), where he coined the term "self-healing grid," and led the development of more than 19 technologies being transferred to industry. After 9/11, Amin directed all security-related research and development, and twice received Chauncey Awards at EPRI, the institute’s highest honor. He is a member of the Board on Infrastructure and the Constructed Environment at the U.S. National Academy of Engineering, and is an IEEE Senior Member. For additional publications, see http://umn.edu/~amin. Comments may be submitted to todaysengineer@ieee.org. Opinions expressed are the author's.