by George F. McClure
The risk that bankrupt United Airlines might not make required
contributions to its defined-benefit (DB) pension plans ($4.1
billion over the next five years) has highlighted the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) role in guaranteeing some
portion of single-employer pension plans (www.nytimes.com).
Four of the 10 largest claims that PBGC has taken over — not
including United — are from airlines.
Before the
Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
few rules governed defined-benefit pension plan funding, and
participants had no guarantees that they would receive the
benefits promised. When Studebaker-Packard’s pension plan failed
in the 1960s, for example, many plan participants lost their
pensions1. Such experiences prompted the passage of ERISA to
protect retirement savings of Americans covered by private
pension plans. Along with other changes, ERISA established PBGC
to pay benefits — subject to certain limits — to participants
when employers could not. PBGC, a quasi-public agency, functions
as an insurer; it collects premiums from employers with
DB pension funds and uses those premiums to make
payments to participants, if the pension plan sponsor defaults2.
PBGC Benefit Limits
A statutory limit
exists on the amount of a plan’s benefit
that PBGC can guarantee. Under the single-employer program, PBGC
adjusts the
limit annually based on changes in the Social
Security contribution and benefit base. The base is permanently
established for each pension plan based on the date the plan
terminates. For plans with a 2004 termination date, for example,
the maximum guarantee is $44,386.32 yearly ($3,698.86 monthly)
for a single-life annuity beginning at age 65 (www.pbgc.gov/about/BENEFITS.htm).
PBGC also limits its guarantee to certain benefits, including
so-called shutdown benefits — significant subsidized early
retirement benefits triggered by layoffs or plant closings that
occur before plan termination. The guarantee does not generally
include supplemental benefits, such as the temporary benefits
some plans pay to
participants from the time they retire until they are eligible
for Social Security benefits.
Airlines
Pass the Buck
When US Airways tried to
terminate its pilots' pension fund as apart of its bid to emerge
from its first bankruptcy, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
fought the more vigorously in U.S. Bankruptcy Court. ALPA
charged that the company was "attempting to force pilots to bear
an unacceptable and unjust burden that permanently harms pilots'
retirement income." But despite ALPA's objections, US Airways
successfully passed responsibility for the pilots' pension fund
to PGBC. Underfunded by $2.5 billion, it is the sixth largest
pension fund PBGC assumed in its 28-year history.
(www.pbgc.gov/news/press_releases/2003/pr03_32.htm).
Because of the financial transactions
associated with the breakup and sale of Pan American Airways
assets in 1991, some employees with pension credits received less than
they thought they were entitled to. These employees have formed
an association that continues to dispute the PBGC settlement
(www.panam.com/afpae.asp).
Reform Before Crisis
Twenty percent of private-sector workers are covered by
defined-benefit plans. Although the majority of DB pension plans
insured by the PBGC are well funded, a significant minority of
plans — primarily those in the airline and steel industries — are underfunded. And unfortunately, underfunding levels in these
plans continue to grow.
In its most recent financial report, the PBGC reported a $278.6
billion deficit in pension funding by companies with more than
$50 million in unfunded liabilities — up substantially from $18.4 billion
reported in 1999. Although lump sum payments may be more
expensive for a plan than the comparable annuity, this minimum
funding deficit does not take lump sum payouts into account. The
average funded ratio is less than 70 percent of total
liabilities (www.pbgc.gov/news/press_releases/2004/pr04_53.htm).
PBGC has sufficient assets on hand to pay benefits for several
years. But serious structural issues exist that require
fundamental reform to the defined benefit system now. In
addition, PBGC’s deficit is the largest in its history and is
still growing. It behooves us to address these matters before
the deficit reaches a crisis point. Current pension funding
rules have acted to delay needed pension funding. Employers find
that they are being hit with substantial funding requirements when
they can least afford them. Deferring action would risk
subjecting the entire pension system to similar but much more
serious strains in the future.
PBGC Program Listed as “High Risk”
The
U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO), an arm of Congress
that acts as a watchdog over the federal Executive branch of
U.S. Government, has found that the health of PBGC’s single-employer insurance program requires policymakers’
attention. The office pointed to several systemic problems that pose
serious risk to PBGC. For example, the insured participant base
continues to shift away from active workers, falling from 78
percent of
all insured participants in 1980 to only 53 percent in 2000. In
addition, GAO noted that the insurance risk pool “has become
concentrated in industries affected by global competition and
the movement from an industrial to a knowledge-based economy”
(www.pbgc.gov/news/speeches/testimony_101403.pdf). In
2001, almost half of all program-insured participants were in
plans sponsored by firms in manufacturing industries.
Because of PBGC’s extraordinary one-year loss, the dramatic
increase in pension underfunding, and the risk of additional
large claims on the program, GAO recently placed the
single-employer insurance program on its “high risk” list
(www.gao.gov/new.items/d031050sp.pdf).
This designation should spur reforms to protect
primary stakeholders in the pension insurance system — participants and premium payers. The PBGC is not authorized to
use taxpayer funds to pay private pensions. Should the demand on
PBGC assets exceed funds available, Congress might have to step
in to make up the shortfall. Unfortunately, no current law
permits Congress to fund such a bailout.
References
- The company and the union agreed to terminate the plan along
the lines set out in the collective bargaining agreement:
retirees and retirement-eligible employees over age 60 received full pensions and vested employees under age 60
received a lump-sum payment worth about 15 percent of their
pension values. Employees whose benefit accruals had not vested
— including all employees under age 40 — received nothing.
(James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in
Business: The Studebaker–Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA.”
Buffalo Law Review, vol. 49; Buffalo, NY: 2001: 731).
- Names of guaranteed pension funds that have been taken over
by PBGC can be searched, with names of qualified claimants who
have not drawn the pensions due them, at
www.pbgc.gov/search/default.htm.