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The International Space Station (ISS) Brings Civil Space Program Flaws to Light

by Tom F. Rogers

The civil space program to acquire an orbiting International Space Station (ISS) is currently scheduled for completion in 2004. In October 2002, the World Space Congress noted how much it expects of the ISS. Unfortunately, without change, the program will be hard-pressed to meet those expectations.

At the outset, plans called for the ISS to be completed within a decade. When all is said and done, it will have taken two. Furthermore, it will cost far more and yet provide less than half of the human capability expected just a few years ago. While costs were initially estimated at around $8 billion — some $16 billion in today’s dollars — the "core complete" low Earth orbit (LEO) version will cost some $64 billion, with another $5 billion in overruns that must be worked off within NASA’s essentially constant dollar annual appropriation. And leaders now calculate that the ISS will only be able to accommodate three crewmembers — as opposed to seven — with just four shuttle trips per year to support them. This loss of crew capacity will amount to as much as an 85 percent loss of science-related crew time. Finally, Russia, which is facing formidable obstacles with its own space program, will lead ISS's operations.

The capability cutback has caused considerable dismay among the space science community and has become the topic of  widespread public discussion. Those who have long planned to conduct research on the space station are expressing the most chagrin. An ISS science review panel has gone so far as to say "NASA should cease to characterize the ISS as a science-driven program."

However, such ISS-science discussions do not touch upon a much more fundamental civil space program failing: the much-too-narrow national constituencies that programs such as the ISS now have.

Public Interest Has Ebbed

Initially, the International Space Station program received relatively broad general public support, as many believed the ISS would address many goals, not just science-related ones. Many believed the ISS could be used to learn how people could reside and work in space safely and efficiently for long periods of time; to lead to private-sector commercial and industrial use of space that extended beyond the satellite communications and remote sensing areas; to play a pivotal role in settling on the Moon and exploring asteroids and Mars; and to continue the Cold War era level of space competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

But, with time, such widely appreciated civil space goals received less attention from leaders in Washington, D.C., from universities, and even from space-related companies. It is now clear that the political price for overspending and for focusing the program too much on cultural scientific pursuits has been great.

After believing that its real-term appropriations would increase by 10 percent per year through the 1990s, NASA has instead watched its purchasing power decrease by some 30 percent. Instead, federal dollars have gone to fund things that Americans have deemed of greater value. It seems the civil space program has lost public interest.

One reason for the apathy might be that the American people don’t believe their interests are being considered. Space tourism represents an outstanding example of the space program’s lack of appreciation for the American public’s interest in space. Several studies have concluded that millions of Americans would like to take a space trip. In fact, a space tourism business has an economic potential that could reach several billion dollars per year. If left to our civil space program for private-sector assistance, however, this business would not have even begun. Further, the space station's role in creating this fledgling business venture would also have been denied to those who actually started it: the Russians.

Possible Remedies

The ISS should be used to attract our private sector to nearby orbit. If NASA leased additional habitable LEO space, competitive free enterprise in space could drive down costs. In addition, a significant portion of the appropriations made to support ISS operations and maintenance could be directed toward activities that will help us learn how to reduce the unit cost of the goods and services used there.

The civil space program would benefit tremendously if the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Defense and Transportation worked with NASA to ensure that the ISS helps the United States make greater and quicker progress in the human space flight space arena. The Department of Defense is already cooperating with NASA, particularly in the space transportation improvement area.

The Civil Space Program and National Security

Once again, America has had to make national security a high priority. We should never forget that national security calls for more than military strength. NASA itself was established during the Cold War in part for national security reasons. The civil space program in general — and our role in the ISS program in particular — is simply not pulling its weight to help America extend its high-technology economic base and geopolitical influence into space nearly as fast or as far as it could.

At the October World Space Congress Summit, leaders agreed that space activities must remain relevant. "No one ever will have enough money… if there is no interest from the public at large," they said.

Institutional and programmatic changes that are appropriate to today's circumstances and national security needs should be implemented sooner rather than later throughout the human space flight sector.

Tom Rogers, an IEEE Fellow and Life Member, is Chief Scientist for the Space Transportation Association, Chair of Sophron Foundation, and a member of the IEEE-USA Transportation-Aerospace Technology Policy Committee. He directed the Office of Technology Assessment’s “Space Station” study during the Reagan Administration, and has headed research and development laboratories for the U.S. Air Force and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Rogers was a deputy director of research and engineering in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the first director of research in the Office of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

Opinions expressed are the author’s.